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VECTORS: IMMUNITY IN
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
TIMOTHY M. RAVICH*
ABSTRACT
COVID-19 nearly wiped out demand for commercial air
travel in 2020, driving down passenger traffic by a jaw-dropping
94.3% from the previous year. The airline industry thus understandably lobbied for a government bailout to manage what was nothing short of an existential crisis, with losses exceeding $35 billion.
Less worthy of sympathy, however, were the ad hoc policies airlines unhelpfully put in the path of their customers even while
securing for themselves $25 billion in payroll grants together with a
similar sum in low-interest loans. For example, carriers refused to
provide refunds or liquidate travel credits in a straightforward way
for those whose travel was impacted during the pandemic. These
consumer practices spawned a number of class action “refund cases”
around the nation—nearly all of which were doomed to fail at the
earliest stages of litigation under the terms of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which expressly requires courts to dismiss lawsuits related to airline prices, routes, and services.
But should the law recognize a pandemic exception and allow
consumer tort claims to proceed against airlines arising from the
transmission of infectious diseases? For that matter, could or should
airlines be liable for crew-to-passenger or passenger-to-passenger
transmission of infectious diseases? This Article argues no even if
the risk of epidemics and pandemics are happening more regularly
over the last few decades. Notwithstanding numerous examples of
despicable and infuriating airline policies and practices related to
the pandemic that would be remediable by operation of law if undertaken by other businesses, the exceptional legal immunity airlines
have with respect to general consumer torts promote important and
stabilizing economic policies that should not be undone by courts.
Associate Professor, University of Central Florida, Department of Legal
Studies. © 2021.
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What is more, courts should bar negligence suits against airlines
arising from the alleged transmission of infectious diseases lest
they become immersed in hopeless evidentiary and administrative problems.
In all, as a normative and practical matter, courts should
have a minimal role in the enforcement of consumer protection issues
under the explicit terms of the Airline Deregulation Act. And, when
presented with controversies implicating airline deregulation, courts
should construe existing national and international aviation service
and safety laws as preempting lawsuits against airlines for consumer claims and torts connected to the transmission of infectious
microorganisms on commercial aircraft. To be clear, while this Article bemoans undesirable consequences of the Airline Deregulation
Act relative to passenger claims arising from public health crises
now and in the future, it argues that any policy changes that should
or might occur must do so by lawmakers alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Something was in the air—literally, the COVID-19 virus—
when Ellen Schiller called her airline to cancel a March 8, 2020,
Boston to Rome trip because Italy was closing down.1 The airline
talked her out of it, recommending instead that she should wait
until her flight was officially cancelled because that was the only
event that would qualify her for a refund of her tickets, totaling
more than $3,000 for her family of five.2 As it turned out, the
flight departed as scheduled—without the Schiller family; Italy
imposed a national quarantine the very next day.3 The airline did
not officially cancel the flight, and on that basis, considered the
Schiller family “no-shows.”4 Consequently, the airline claimed that
the passengers forfeited any right to a refund because they did not
earlier rebook their flight to a random later date with the hope that
it would be cancelled.5 Over time the airline relaxed its position,
offering the Schillers a voucher based on an “updated” policy.6 But
the experience was a bad one for the Schillers, and many other
airline passengers had similar inconvenient dealings with airlines.7
“The runaround we got was insane,” Mrs. Schiller recounted.8 The
airline “was ‘intentionally evasive, difficult, and clearly trying to
avoid providing a refund or a credit. I believe they were counting on
my giving up hope.’”9 Indeed, as the Wall Street Journal’s travel
column put it, “[t]he Alitalia example shows how airlines have
essentially been making up their own rules to hold on to customer
cash” during the pandemic.10
To be fair, that airlines struggled to accommodate their customers at the start of a once-in-a-century scourge is unremarkable
in that the spread of the novel coronavirus shocked the airline
1 Scott McCartney, Airlines Are Withholding Billions in Refunds—That’s
Billions with a B, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2019, 9:13 AM) [hereinafter Withholding
Billions], https://www.wsj.com/articles/airlines-are-withholding-billions-in-re
fundsthats-billions-with-a-b-11597238005 [https://perma.cc/HFB4-A9Z7].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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industry perhaps more significantly than it did any other serviceoriented firm in the economy worldwide.11 In fact, COVID-19 overwhelmed airlines everywhere, plunging demand for travel in 2020
and reducing commercial passenger traffic by an astonishing 94.3
percent year on year.12 Airlines grounded fleets to an extent not
seen since September 11, 2001, while aspiring pilots reconsidered
their career options and veteran pilots found new work—some as
truck drivers.13 Several carriers, including Chile’s Latam, Columbia’s Avianca, and the United Kingdom’s Virgin Atlantic, filed for
bankruptcy reorganization.14 Traffic remained depressed into the
early 2020s as airline executives expected corporate travel to take
years to recover.15 The COVID-19 pandemic thus presented an existential crises to the airline industry, which rationally responded
by holding liquidity while lobbying the government for a bailout
that, controversially, bordered on nationalization.16
But the victimized airline industry also played the role of victimizer, or at least aggravator, by inventing numerous administrative headaches for their passengers before and even after securing
Xiaoqian Sun et al., COVID-19 Pandemic and Air Transportation: Successfully Navigating the Paper Hurricane, 94 J. OF AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 1, 1 (2021).
12 Air Passenger Market Analysis, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N 1 (Apr. 2020), https://
www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-passenger
-monthly-analysis---apr-20202/ [https://perma.cc/7WEU-YFNM].
13 See Benjamin Katz et al., From Pilot to Truck Driver—Airline Careers
Grounded by Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2020, 1:52 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/from-pilot-to-truck-driverairline-careers-grounded-by-pandemic
-11607367164 [https://perma.cc/LCC4-8LY8].
14 Withholding Billions, supra note 1.
15 See Alison Sider, Airlines Lower Expectations for Profits as Business Slows,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2021, at A1. To stimulate demand, airlines like United
Airlines implemented a policy requiring all of its U.S. employees to be vaccinated
against COVID-19 or else face termination. See Alison Sider, United Airlines
Employees Sue Over Vaccination Order, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 23, 2021, at B5.
Several of the carrier’s employees sued, alleging discrimination by the airline
against employees who have a religious objection to receiving the vaccine, or who
qualify for accommodations on medical grounds. See id.
16 See Welcome to Uncle Sam Airways, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2020, 6:57 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/welcome-to-uncle-sam-airways-11585781864 [https://
perma.cc/4U7T-Y9JY] (“Helping the airlines weather a 100-year pandemic might
be, arguably, within the government’s job description. Owning them isn’t.”); see
also Roger Lowenstein, Opinion, Airlines Don’t Deserve Another Tax-PayerFinanced Bailout, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/opinion/story/2020-10-19/airlines-bailout-coronavirus-stimulus-bill [https://
perma.cc/7P8E-HGBA].
11
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from taxpayers $25 billion in payroll grants together with a similar sum in low-interest loans.17 In addition to refusing to issue
refunds as in the case of the Schillers,18 for example, airlines made
using airline credits incredibly difficult, too.19 In one (pre-pandemic)
instance a domestic passenger who cancelled a trip because of a
family illness rebooked the trip in order to keep a credit from expiring; the airline charged her a predeparture baggage fee again
and again, each time she rebooked, even though she never left
home.20 “I’m into this for $250 for luggage that went nowhere,” the
passenger said.21 Regrettably, these and other cringeworthy examples of airline passenger conflict are not uncommon—pandemic
or no pandemic.22 But, they are not necessarily illegal either.23
Airlines have complete immunity from state consumer laws
by operation of the federal law known as the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.24 The law explicitly nullifies the enactment or
enforcement of any nonfederal “law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation.”25 As the
Supreme Court recognized, Congress enacted this law to formally
substitute a forty year period of government regulation of nearly
every economic aspect of an airline’s business with “maximum
reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and potential
competition ... [t]o encourage efficient and well-managed carriers to
earn adequate profits and attract capital.”26 As a consequence of
Government aid to airlines during the pandemic was a worldwide affair.
See, e.g., Ruth Bender, Lufthansa Gets $9.81 Billion in Aid, WALL ST. J., May 26,
2020, at B1–B2 (discussing potential bailout deal allowing the German government to take a twenty percent stake in Deutsche Lufthansa AG and appoint
two supervisory board seats).
18 Withholding Billions, supra note 1.
19 Id.
20 Scott McCartney, Airlines Aren’t Making It Easy to Use Covid Credits,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2020, 11:02 AM) [hereinafter Airlines Aren’t Making It Easy],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/airlines-arent-making-it-easy-to-use-covid-credits
-11609171369 [https://perma.cc/N979-NB3T].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 49 U.S.C. § 41713(a), (b)(1).
25 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
26 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4), (a)(9)).
17
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this express legislative intention, state consumer protection laws
are all but useless when asserted against airlines, which possess
a rare and powerful set of legal defenses (i.e., preemption) that are
not usually available to firms in similar commercial cases. Stated
otherwise, claims such as deceptive and unfair trade practices, unjust enrichment, or breach of contract routinely proceed and succeed against companies in state and federal court, but regularly
fail at the pleading stage on the basis of the Airline Deregulation Act when asserted by airline passengers against airlines.27
Indeed, consumer-oriented lawsuits against airlines rarely
ever get off the ground—by design.28 Relatedly, an extensive body
of literature exists detailing the inverse relationship between airline service, on the one hand, and customer satisfaction, on the
other hand, as a result of deregulation.29 But while the benefits
and drawbacks of airline deregulation are debatable in “normal”
circumstances, the potential unfairness for consumers (like the
Schillers) arising from the laissez faire regulatory policies underlying the Airline Deregulation Act is particularly apparent in
the context of difficult circumstances (e.g., COVID-19) that are
relatively less in the control of passengers than of airlines.30 No
See Paul Dempsey, Federal Preemption of State Regulation of Airline Pricing,
Routes, and Services: The Airline Deregulation Act, 10 FIU L. REV. 435, 438, 440
(2015); see also All World Pro. Travel Servs., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
28 See, e.g., Christopher Elliott, Refund-Related Lawsuits Against Airlines are
Taking Off, but Will They Succeed?, USA TODAY (May 15, 2020, 7:00 AM)
[hereinafter Refund-Related Lawsuits], https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel
/advice/2020/05/15/coronavirus-want-sue-your-airline-get-refund-read-first/51
85753002/ [https://perma.cc/3EHQ-GCVG].
29 See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking
Forward, 7 YALE J. REG. 325, 325 (1990) [hereinafter Deregulation: Looking
Backward]; see also Andrew R. Goetz & Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 927,
943 (1989); Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation—A Case Study in Public
Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 179, 192 (1988); Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Deregulation—A Mixed Bag, but a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J.
229, 251 (1988); Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation
and the Public Interest, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 194 (1981); C. Vincent
Olson & John M. Trapani, III, Who Has Benefited from Regulation of the Airline
Industry?, 24 J.L. & ECON. 75, 76 (1981); WILLIAM A. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS 4 (1970).
30 See Goetz & Dempsey, supra note 29, at 962.
27
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company wants to refund monies or cancel contracts, of course, let
alone during a period in which the firm’s very existence is at stake.
At the same time, however, a legal regime such as the Airline Deregulation Act that affords consumers little to no leverage when
bargaining with powerful firms is problematic.31 For that matter,
many other companies severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, including leisure and travel companies like cruise lines,
refunded monies to passengers whose travel was impacted by the
pandemic.32 As such, whether the law as a general matter should
tolerate consumer practices by airlines during a global emergency
that would be illegal if undertaken by nonairline firms that are
suffering as much if not more than air carriers (e.g., childcare facilities, restaurants, retailers, etc.) is an open question.33 Indeed, at
what time more than a global calamity should the law protect consumers from corporate misconduct and unfair bargaining power?34
This Article posits that a series of global health menaces
over the last two decades that involve commercial air travel—from
SARS to Ebola to Zika to West Nile virus to COVID-19—invites
a reexamination of the preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act as applied to passenger consumer law claims.
This is especially so because, unfortunately, the most recent pandemic is unlikely to be the last that will disrupt public air travel.35
Clarifying the scope of the law now will thus avoid uncertainty
and frustration for airlines and consumers going forward, not to
See Deregulation: Looking Backward, supra note 29, at 334.
See, e.g., Morgan Hines, My Cruise Was Canceled Due to Coronavirus. Here’s
How Experts Say You Should Navigate Refunds, Credits, USA TODAY (Apr. 15,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/2020/04/15
/coronavirus-canceled-my-cruise-heres-how-get-refund-credit/5077401002/
[https://perma.cc/3PUR-VBKU].
33 For example, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, airlines were booking
“phantom flights,” locking consumers into “no-refund policies for canceled flights.”
Tamara Thiessen, Flight Refunds: US Airlines Using People As Piggy Banks
During Covid-19, FORBES (June 3, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tamara
thiessen/2020/06/03/flight-refunds-us-airlines-chinese-piggy-banks-covid-19/?
sh=34ddac343e8e [https://perma.cc/NU5L-5EA4].
34 For example, after national emergencies caused by natural disasters, like
hurricanes, state attorney generals are equipped with antiprice gouging and
other laws to protect consumers. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160(1)(b)(2) (2021).
35 See Stefan Gössling et al., Pandemics, Tourism, and Global Change: A
Rapid Assessment of COVID-19, 29 J. SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 1, 4–5 (2021).
31
32
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mention futile lawsuits centered on issues best resolved at airport
ticket counters not in courthouses. In this context, this Article
argues that issues of health, safety, and public welfare fall within
the phrase “prices, routes, or services” in the preemption clause
of the Airline Deregulation Act as applied to consumer actions
against airlines, and claims related to these matters should be
disposed of at the motion to dismiss stage.36 Furthermore, this Article argues that, as a normative and practical matter, courts should
construe existing aviation service and safety laws to preempt claims
against airlines connected to the transmission of infectious microorganisms on commercial aircraft.37
To advance these arguments, this Article makes two empirical claims about airline customer service during and after the
pandemic period, one descriptive and one interpretive. The descriptive claim is that application of the Airline Deregulation Act’s
preemption provision to consumer tort claims arising from the
transmission of infectious diseases during commercial air travel is
less automatic than may be obvious under existing precedent applying that provision. To support this contention, this Article
presents an empirical study, qualitatively analyzing how courts
construe the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption provision, quantitatively assessing a split among the federal circuit courts of appeal, and hypothesizing how courts may resolve such claims under
the framework for adjudicating claims under the Airline Deregulation Act as either expressly or impliedly (field) preempted.38
Next, the Article’s interpretive claim is that the provision
of a healthful aircraft cabin is not a “service” as the majority of
federal appellate courts have defined that term under the Airline
Deregulation Act.39 As such, the Airline Deregulation Act does not
preempt negligence based claims arising from an airline’s failure
to take steps to mitigate or eliminate the risk of transmission of
infectious diseases aboard their aircraft.40 However, providing a
healthful aircraft environment should be construed as a matter
of safety primarily, and as such, courts should dismiss passenger
tort claims arising from the transmission of infectious disease under
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); see infra Part III.
See infra Section III.C.
38 See infra Part I.
39 See infra Part II.
40 See infra Part III.
36
37
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one of two basis—as a matter of safety, or pursuant to the explicit
terms of the Airline Deregulation Act, which nullifies state action
“relat[ing] to” airline “price[s].”41
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I evaluates the risk
of disease transmission on commercial flights according to applicable scientific literature assessing what infectious disease experts
know (or think they know) about transmission within the aircraft
passenger cabin.42 It also describes the national and international
laws and guidance documents that influence government and carrier management of the movement of passengers with communicable diseases.43 Part II discusses the mechanics of preemption
analysis under the Airline Deregulation Act and synthesizes the
law to form a workable understanding of how courts construe the
phrase “relating to” and the terms “price[s], route[s], and service[s]”
under the law.44 Part III then applies these terms as construed
by federal courts of appeal to evaluate how courts might decide
consumer tort cases under the doctrines of express and implied
(field) preemption.45 Also assessed is whether an airline’s provision of a healthful aircraft cabin is a matter of safety, in which
case precedent supports preemption.46 Part IV offers analysis in
the context of international treaties that govern commercial air
transportation.47 Finally, the Conclusion provides an evaluation
of the advantages and disadvantages of a legal regime in which
courts disallow rare claims arising from pandemic standards generated problems.48 Altogether, this Article recommends immunity
for airlines associated with the transmission of infectious diseases
such as COVID-19.
I.PATHOGENS ON AIRPLANES
Before evaluating airline liability under the Airline Deregulation Act during health crises, this Part aims to appraise the actual
risk of infectious disease transmission aboard civil aircraft. In doing
See infra Part III; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
See infra Section I.A.
43 See infra Section I.B.
44 See infra Part II; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), (b)(4)(A).
45 See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
46 See infra Section III.C.
47 See infra Part IV.
48 See infra Conclusion.
41
42
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so, this Part intends to establish background from which to think
about the follow on question of liability and whether and where
responsibility should lie as a policy and legal matter. After all, if
the risks are high and avoidable, then imposing a legal obligation
on airlines to do more may be more justifiable than if risks are
low and manageable by passengers also.49
Additionally, this Part examines existing national and international laws, policies, and guidelines designed to safeguard
public health aboard aircraft. This analysis is intended to lay the
groundwork for Parts II and III, infra, which center on whether
courts should construe airline vector control and health screening
strategies as: (1) falling within the ambit of the “prices, routes,
and services” terminology of the Airline Deregulation Act, in which
case passenger claims would be preempted as a matter of law, or
(2) as concerning matters of safety, in which case airline immunity is arguable.50
Driving this work is the unexpected fact that the epidemiology of infectious diseases associated with air travel and the
challenges of infection control are understudied even if universally regarded as important public health concerns.51 In the absence of definitive research, discussion about what airlines should
or should not do as a matter of law to mitigate the transmission
of infectious disease too often lacks depth and substance, devolving into a blame game that alarms travelers and damns air carriers.52 This sort of unproductive burden shifting has already taken
place during the COVID-19 pandemic.53
For example, in December 2020, a United Airlines passenger
bound for Los Angeles from Orlando attested in a predeparture
“Ready-to-Fly” checklist that he had not tested positive for the
See Domestic Travel During COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travel
ers/travel-during-covid19.html [https://perma.cc/M8RH-3M8N].
50 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); see infra Parts II, III.
51 See Alexandra Mangili et al., Infectious Risks of Air Travel, MICROBIOLOGY
SPECTRUM 1, 2 (2015).
52 See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, Passenger Who Had Medical Emergency on Flight
Died of Covid-19, Coroner Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/12/22/us/united-airlines-covid-death-lax.html [https://perma.cc
/6YB8-N5GP].
53 See, e.g., id.
49
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coronavirus and that he did not have symptoms of COVID-19.54
However, he experienced a medical emergency twenty minutes into
the flight, prompting several other passengers and flight attendants
to offer help, including by administering CPR for forty-five minutes as the pilots diverted the flight to New Orleans—where the
passenger died.55 A social media firestorm erupted on news that
the deceased passenger’s wife had told emergency responders that
her husband had COVID-19,56 that the Louisiana coroner concluded that he died from acute respiratory failure and COVID-19
symptoms, and that the airline continued to fly the airplane on
which the decedent traveled on to California as planned.57 Rather
than reporting on the actual risk to other passengers or whether
the airline did anything wrong (it did not),58 the sensational and
sensationalized story of United Airlines Flight 591 mostly centered on a narrative of a callous airline that distributed modestly
valued vouchers instead of invaluable information to passengers
who acted as Good Samaritans: “Any kind of statement ... to show
that the higher ups in the company were following the story” would
have been appreciated, reportedly said one of the passengers, but
“the only thing I ever saw were the statements saying it wasn’t
their responsibility to notify passengers.”59
To be sure, communication between passengers and airlines
is strained and the COVID-19 pandemic has only agitated circumstances with conflicts breaking out over airline face mask requirements.60 In this context, and given that the risk management (i.e.,
Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 In the aftermath of the tragedy, consistent with federal guidelines, the
airline provided the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with a passenger
manifest for contact tracing purposes. See Mina Kaji & Amanda Maile, Man
Who Died After Collapsing on United Flight Had COVID-19, Coroner Confirms,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2020, 7:11 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/man-died-col
lapsing-united-flight-covid-19-coroner/story?id=74868916 [https://perma.cc
/EG3B-FJMU].
59 Hannah Sampson, A Man Tried to Save a United Passenger who Died of
Covid-19. The Airline Offered Him $200, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2021, 1:39 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2021/01/19/united-flight-passenger-co
vid-death/ [https://perma.cc/KDB5-H2RL].
60 See, e.g., Lori Aratani, Unruly Airplane Behavior Prompted Harsher Penalties and More Enforcement, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.se
54
55
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regulation or rule-making) associated with transporting infected
passengers requires knowledge of transmission dynamics,61 this
Section reviews the relevant scientific, industry, and law-centered
knowledge in order to establish a workable baseline about the
knowable risk of transmission of infectious disease presented during
commercial air travel.62
A. What Are the Risks of Infectious Disease Transmission on
Commercial Flights?
No doubt exists that commercial aviation is a potential driver
impacting the epidemiology of infectious disease.63 Commercial airplanes are themselves vectors of infectious diseases.64 For, whether
or not infectious airline passengers or crew transmit illness to each
other while on board aircraft, or whether or not healthy patients
contract illness from crew members or other passengers, airplanes
themselves potentially import pathogens from endemic areas of the
world to nonendemic places and fuel, if not spark, pandemics.65 For
example, the scientific community believes that the transmission of
the Zika virus was introduced to the Americas by air travel and
that infected mosquitos on international flights contributed to
the global spread of malaria, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) and the West Nile virus.66
Yet, in contrast to what is broadly understood about airplanes as vectors for the spread of microorganisms, significant
uncertainty exists about passenger to passenger transmission of
infectious disease and data are lacking about the effects of air
quality on cabin occupants.67 This is unexpected given the outsized
impact that air travel (and international travel especially) can
attletimes.com/nation-world/unruly-airplane-behavior-prompted-harsher-penal
ties-and-more-enforcement-its-not-working-lawmakers-say/ [https://perma.cc
/N62A-F2J7].
61 See Alexandra Mangili & Mark Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious
Diseases During Commercial Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 989 (2005).
62 See infra Section I.A.
63 See infra Section I.A.
64 See id. at 992 (“The aircraft as a vector for global spread of influenza
strains is a greater concern than is in-flight transmission.”).
65 Id. at 993.
66 Nuno Rodrigues Faria et al., Zika Virus in the Americas: Early Epidemiological and Genetic Findings, 352 SCI. 345, 346 (2016).
67 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 990.
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have on the epidemiology of infectious disease.68 For that matter,
anecdotal evidence suggests a strong correlation between commercial flying and upper respiratory tract illness.69 Flying is a great
way to get a head cold, the thinking goes. And, indeed, airline passengers have long associated catching cold- or flu-like symptoms
with the cabin air quality and ventilation in commercial aircraft.70
After all, “[d]uring flight, the aircraft cabin is a ventilated, enclosed
environment that exposes passengers to hypobaric hypoxia, dry
humidity, and close proximity to fellow passengers.”71 At least one
study lends credence to the suspicion about the healthfulness of
airplane cabins, identifying the risk of contracting an upper respiratory tract infection while in this confined ecosystem as high
as twenty percent or 113 times greater than the normal daily
ground level transmission rate.72 Notwithstanding these and
other problems potentially caused or spread by the volume of
passengers traveling annually (approximately 3 billion),73 the
latest research pegs the risk of transmission of infectious diseases
aboard aircraft as “difficult to determine” or unknown, with “the
perceived risk [being] greater than the actual risk.”74
See id. at 991.
Martin B. Hocking & Harold D. Foster, Common Cold Transmission in
Commercial Aircraft: Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENVI. HEALTH
RSCH. 7, 7 (2004).
70 See, e.g., Scott McCartney, Where Germs Lurk on Planes, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702040584045
77108420985863872 [https://perma.cc/TD3B-JXYH]. Only three studies of inflight
transmission of the flu have been reported, for example. Mangili & Gendreau,
supra note 61, at 992. The first occurred in 1979, when seventy-two percent of
all passengers aboard an airliner contracted the influenza A/Texas strain within seventy-two hours. Id. The high transmission rate was attributed to a threehour period during which passengers were kept aboard an aircraft with an inoperative ventilation system while repair work was being done. Id. The second study involved the transmission of influenza A/Taiwan/1/86 at a naval
station both on the ground and aboard two aircraft transporting a squadron
from Puerto Rico to a Florida naval station. Id. The third outbreak happened
in 1999 on a seventy-five seat aircraft carrying mine workers. Id. No influenza
outbreaks aboard commercial aircraft have been reported since 1999. Id.
71 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 989.
72 Hocking & Foster, supra note 69, at 7.
73 Vicki Stover Hertzberg et al., Behaviors, Movements, and Transmission
of Droplet-Mediated Respiratory Diseases During Transcontinental Airline Flights,
115 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 3623, 3623 (2018).
74 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 990, 994 (“The aircraft as a vector for global spread of influenza strains is a greater concern than is in-flight
68
69
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A silver lining to the COVID-19 pandemic may be that its
economic devastation has motivated airlines, airplane manufactures, and regulators to get better answers and to research in a
concerted way the behavior of viruses inside jetliners.75 Such efforts
to better understand the airline cabin environment and the health
of passengers and crew are welcome as the work done by aviation
stakeholders several decades ago did not progress terribly far.76
For example, the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and commensurate reports that a small number
of SARS infections occurred on board aircraft prompted Congress
to reassess the quality of air aboard airplanes.77 Yet, that research
explained that no definitive link between broad, nonspecific health
complaints of passengers and flight attendants to possible causes,
including cabin air quality, existed, despite the unique and unusual
ecosystem of an airplane cabin.78 What is more, no peer-reviewed
scientific work had linked cabin air quality and aircraft ventilation with any heightened health risks of flying (as opposed to other
modes of transportation).79
Rather, the leading literature covering the transmission
of infectious disease during commercial air travel gravitates toward the idea that risk is most closely correlated with where a
passenger is seated, and for how long, in relation to an infected
passenger.80 More specifically, according to the World Health
Organization (WHO), the primary risk of disease transmission is
with a flight time of more than eight hours and sitting within
two rows of an infectious passenger.81 As applied to COVID-19,
transmission.”) (emphasis added); see also Arnold Barnett & Keith Fleming,
COVID-19 Risk Among Airline Passengers; Should the Middle Seat Stay Empty?
18 (Aug. 2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Actually ...
covid-19 infections on planes can cause deaths to some people who [are] not passengers (e.g., a 22-year[-old] traveler gets infected, and passes the virus on to
his elderly grandparents).”).
75 See Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 989.
76 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-54, MORE RESEARCH NEEDED
ON THE EFFECTS OF AIR QUALITY ON AIRLINER CABIN OCCUPANTS 1 (2004).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 11.
79 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 990.
80 See id. at 991.
81 Id.

136 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:121
researchers estimate that risk depends on the distance between two
passengers such that a passenger’s infection rate is approximately
thirteen percent given physical contact with another contagious
person, but essentially falls by a factor of two as the distance from
that person increases by one meter.82
However, the application of the “2-row” rule has found a
mixed reception. 83 For example, a paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences indicated that a “dropletmediated respiratory infectious disease was unlikely to be directly
transmitted beyond [one meter] from the infectious passenger,”84
suggesting a more conservative understanding to public health
guidance calling for surveillance of passengers within two rows
of an infectious passenger.85
A different study detailed the need for greater caution.
That warning arose from the study of a Hong Kong to Beijing
flight that accounted for almost two dozen cases of SARS and
more than 300 people (i.e., not passengers) who might have been
secondarily affected—all from a single ill passenger.86 The duration of the flight was three hours and affected passengers who were
seated as far as seven rows in front and five rows behind the index passenger, a pattern (see Figure 1, below) that did not follow
the typical example of inflight transmission of airborne pathogens
(e.g., flight time of more than eight hours and seating within two
rows of the index passenger).87 Researchers have offered several
explanations for this unexpected outbreak distribution, including that transmission of SARS was a result of a viral plume,
that the airplane’s cabin filtration system was malfunctioning,
or that passengers were infected before or after the flight.88

See D. Chu et al., Physical Distancing, Face Masks, and Eye Protection,
To Prevent Person-to-Person Transmission of SARS-Cov-2 and COVID-19: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 395 LANCET 1973, 1982 (2020).
83 Vicki Stover Hertzberg & Howard Weiss, On the 2-Row Rule for Infectious
Disease Transmission on Aircraft, 82 ANNALS GLOB. HEALTH 819, 819 (2017).
84 Hertzberg et al., supra note 73, at 3625.
85 Id.
86 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 992.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 991–92.
82
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FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF SARS OUTBREAK ABOARD
HONG KONG-BEIJING FLIGHT (2003)89
While what happened on the Hong Kong to Beijing flight
may be anomalous or never fully understood, the regulatory response to news of the super spreading event was impactful.90 That
is, no onboard transmissions of SARS have occurred since March
2003, when the WHO issued specific guidelines for inflight containment of SARS.91 This suggests a powerful influence regulatory or standards setting authorities can exert in the management
of airline associated infectious diseases.92 In this regard, the next
Section details both the potential and limitations of existing legal
and regulatory guidance and governance associated with the transmission of infectious disease aboard aircraft.93
B. Disconnects: Global Guidance and National Legislation
Just as researchers have long lacked solid epidemiological
data about the effects of air quality on aircraft cabin occupants,94 so
too have national and international laws and regulations related
to infection control measures for air travel failed to achieve an
overall coherence or enforceability.95
Id. at 991 fig.2.
Id. at 992.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 994.
93 See infra Section I.B.
94 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 61, at 990–91.
95 See id. at 994.
89
90
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Internationally, a number of different public health measures
exist to control airline associated infectious disease.96 Essentially
two entities are vested with authority to impact international aviation operations. One is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations body that governs many operational
aspects of international aviation.97 A second is the International
Air Transport Association (IATA), the trade association of the
world’s airlines responsible for setting industry technical standards.98 ICAO and IATA frequently coordinate with WHO to provide health related recommendations.99 But this work often runs
into significant headwinds in the form of national laws and policies
that allow for the discretionary adoption of international controls.100
As a team of Australian researchers noted in an opinion paper entitled “Guidelines, Law, and Governance: Disconnects in the
Global Control of Airline-Associated Infectious Disease,” “[n]ational
guidance and legislation are uncoordinated across countries, and—
with no strong evidence underpinning control measures—they
are often inconsistent.”101 For example, national laws in Australia and New Zealand require usage of insecticides in commercial
aviation operations whereas the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency prohibits usage of some insecticides because of potential
risks to aircrew.102 In 2013, ICAO encouraged more research into
nonchemical disinsection procedures, but “procedures have not
changed and airplane disinsection policies and implementation remain inconsistent worldwide.”103 These and other control measures
for airline associated infectious diseases are thus weak, as perhaps
additionally exemplified by the fact that International Health Regulations adopted by almost 200 nations for the purpose of controlling
Id.
About ICAO, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/DMW2-VE3Q].
98 Vision and Mission, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N (IATA), https://www.iata
.org/en/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/Q43Q-MJCW].
99 Andrea Grout et al., Guidelines, Law, and Governance: Disconnects in
the Global Control of Airline-Associated Infectious Disease, 17 LANCET e118,
e119 (2017).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
96
97
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the global spread of disease express only one provision relating
to air travel—a requirement that the pilots in command merely
provide a brief aircraft general declaration of passenger health
to ground staff before disembarkation.104
U.S. law similarly provides a regulatory framework whose
effectiveness at mitigating the transmission of infectious disease
aboard aircraft is as potentially toothless as international guidelines.105 For example, pursuant to the Public Health Services Act
enacted in 2012, Congress authorized the creation of Do Not Board
(DNB) list.106 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) maintain DNB lists in order to prevent passengers with certain contagious diseases from obtaining a boarding pass for any
flight into, out of, or within the United States; the Transportation Security Administration enforces this list for commercial air
travel.107 In addition, under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA may take actions necessary to mitigate threats to
aviation and transportation security, including denying boarding
to travelers that the CDC identifies as likely posing a public health
threat to passengers or crew.108 Placement on the DNB list is a time
consuming process, however, and the strength of these prevention methods is questionable.109
Apart from government and industry led initiatives, the law
vests airlines with self-executing authority to refuse to transport
passengers they consider to be health risks, including that the
passengers present a threat to spread communicable diseases or
infections.110 But, the applicable law—the Air Carrier Access Act
Id.
See id. at e120.
106 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–65; see also Criteria for Requesting Federal Travel
Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers,
80 Fed. Reg. 16400 (Mar. 27, 2015); Dep’ts of Health and Hum. Servs. Ctrs. for
Disease Control and Prevention, Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health
Purposes—United States, June 2007–May 2008, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 1009, 1009 (2008).
107 FAQs for Public Health Do Not Board and Lookout Lists, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 16, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/quaran
tine/do-not-board-faq.html [https://perma.cc/VNV3-GWPX].
108 49 U.S.C. § 114.
109 Kathryn Brown, Please Expect Turbulence: Liability for Communicable
Disease Transmission During Air Travel, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1081, 1103 (2017).
110 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b) (2016) (citing 14 C.F.R. § 382.19(c)(1)–(2)). In distinguishing communicable disease or condition from a disability, the regulations
104
105
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(ACAA)—is an antidiscrimination law in nature.111 As such, airlines are not permitted to limit a passenger’s access to transportation on the mere basis that the passenger has a communicable
disease or other condition by, for example, refusing to transport the
passenger, delaying the passenger’s transportation (e.g., requiring
the passenger to take a later flight), imposing on the passenger any
condition, restriction, or requirement not imposed on other passengers, or requiring the passenger to provide a medical certificate.112 Rather, under the terms of the ACAA, an airline may bar a
passenger from boarding a flight only after first determining a passenger’s condition poses a “direct threat”113—an assessment fraught
with difficulty and potential liability for the airline itself, among
other reasons because airline personnel are not necessarily qualified to make this medical determination and because the tests airlines may be asked to use are not themselves foolproof.114
Even with perfect information, the process to establish a
“direct threat” involves many steps and presents many judgment
calls.115 First, the, ACAA permits (though does not require) airlines to “rely on directives issued by public health authorities,”
including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control or Public Health
Service or comparable agencies in other countries, or the WHO.116
The ACAA also explicitly requires airlines to determine the existence of a “direct threat” by considering “the significance of the
consequences of a communicable disease and the degree to which it
can be readily transmitted by casual contact in an aircraft cabin
environment.”117 In this context, the regulations disallow airlines
provide that an airline is not permitted to “refuse to provide transportation to
a passenger with a disability because the person’s disability results in appearance or involuntary behavior that may offend, annoy, or inconvenience
crewmembers or other passengers.” 14 C.F.R § 382.19(b).
111 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.1.
112 See 14 C.F.R § 382.21(a)(1)–(4).
113 See id.
114 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b)(1)–(2); see also Scott McCartney, Why Airlines
Let Sick Passengers on Flights, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2021), https://www-wsj-com
.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.wsj.com/amp/articles/why-airlines-let-sick-passen
gers-on-flights-11623848201 [https://perma.cc/Z9DU-AZ6K]; Scott McCartney,
The Airline Bet on Covid Tests, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2020, at A11 (reporting about
fake negative test certificates cropping up for sale and forgery concerns).
115 14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2016).
116 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b)(1).
117 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b)(1)–(2).
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from characterizing a passenger with the common cold as a “direct threat” because colds do not have severe health consequences
even if they are readily transmissible in an aircraft cabin environment.118 Nor would a passenger who is HIV-positive or who
has AIDS be a “direct threat” because, though posing “very severe
health consequences,” those diseases are not readily transmissible in an aircraft carrier.119 In contrast, the regulations expressly
recognize Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) as a “direct threat” insofar as “SARS may be readily transmissible in an
aircraft cabin environment and has severe health consequences.
Someone with SARS probably poses a direct threat.”120 Neither
regulators nor courts have yet assessed whether or how the ACAA
would apply in terms of COVID-19, though it ostensibly seems more
akin to SARS (a “direct threat”) than HIV or the common cold (not
“direct threats”).121
In any case, even a passenger with a communicable disease that meets the “direct threat” criteria of the ACAA has a
pathway to flying.122 Such a passenger can present a carrier with a
medical certificate describing measures for preventing transmission of the disease during the normal course of the flight,123 at
which point the airline must provide transportation to the passenger, unless the airline is “unable to carry out the measures.”124
What is more, airlines may require that a passenger with a medical certificate undergo additional medical review if there is a legitimate medical reason for believing that there has been a significant
adverse change in the passenger’s condition since the issuance of
the medical certificate or that the certificate significantly understates the passenger’s risk to the health of other persons on the
14 C.F.R. § 382.21(b)(2) (ex. 1).
Id. (ex. 2).
120 Id. (ex. 3).
121 14 C.F.R. § 382.21.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(c). The regulations elaborate that “a medical certificate is a written statement from the passenger’s physician saying that the disease
or infection would not, under the present conditions in the particular passenger’s case, be communicable to other persons during the normal course of a flight.”
Id. The medical certificate must state any conditions or precautions that would
have to be observed to prevent the transmission of the disease or infection to other
persons in the normal course of a flight. Id. A medical certificate must also be
dated within ten days of the date of the flight for which it is presented. Id.
118
119
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flight.125 If the results of this medical review demonstrate that
the passenger, notwithstanding the medical certificate, is likely to
be unable to complete the flight without requiring extraordinary
medical assistance (e.g., the passenger has apparent significant
difficulty in breathing, appears to be in substantial pain, etc.) or
would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other persons
on the flight, the carrier may limit the passenger’s access to transportation as otherwise prohibited under § 382.21(a).126
Generally, if an airline’s actions result in the postponement
of a passenger’s travel, it must permit the passenger to travel at a
later time (i.e., up to ninety days from the date of the postponed
travel) at the fare that would have applied to the passenger’s originally scheduled trip without penalty, or at the passenger’s discretion, provide a refund for any unused flights, including return
flights.127 Moreover, if an airline takes action that restricts a passenger’s travel, it must, on the passenger’s request, provide a
written explanation within ten days of the request.128 On March 2,
2020, however, the United States Department of Transportation
(DOT) modified this regulatory framework by issuing an Enforcement Notice related to the ability of airlines to refuse transportation to a passenger who has or may have COVID-19.129 It relieved
airlines of the obligation to obtain a medical certificate from a
passenger as a precondition of a decision to deny boarding, but held
airlines to their responsibility to otherwise accommodate a passenger impacted by an adverse decision:
As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the Enforcement Office
will not enforce the requirement that airlines first request a medical certificate before denying boarding to individuals who have
been screened by airlines, and are suspected of having COVID-19
on flights to the United States from countries with travel health
notices issued by CDC stemming from the COVID-19 epidemic. 130

See id.
See id.
127 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(d).
128 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21(e).
129 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ENFORCEMENT NOTICE REGARDING DENYING
BOARDING BY AIRLINES OF INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF HAVING CORONAVIRUS
3 (2020) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT NOTICE].
130 Id.
125
126
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The potential for COVID-19 to spread rapidly and cause
severe disease and death highlights the fact that obtaining a medical certificate would likely not be sufficient to demonstrate that
a passenger is not a direct threat to the health or safety of others.131
There are no known measures that will prevent the transmission
of COVID-19 in a closed environment, such as an aircraft.132
The Enforcement Office cautions airlines that this enforcement policy does not change their current obligation to allow
passengers to travel at a later time if the passenger’s travel had
to be postponed, or provide a refund to the passenger for any
unused flights.133 This policy also does not affect the obligations
of airlines to provide a written explanation to the passenger of
the reason that the passenger’s travel was restricted.134
Suffice it to say that refusing to transport a passenger is
burdensome for airlines and presents a number of potentially insurmountable administrative and practical challenges, not to mention
the prospect of an enforcement action alleging discrimination.135
The ACAA not only requires airlines to make determinations in
matters for which they are not qualified (or, at least, are less
qualified than say health care providers) to assess the threat of
pathogens,136 but also demands that airlines make a preflight
See id.
See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Interestingly, there is no private right of action under the ACAA. Madison Gafford, Taking an Independent Look at the Air Carrier Access Act: Why
No Private Right of Action Exists, 84 J. AIR L. & COM. 135, 135 (2019). As such
Part 382 (as the ACAA is also known) an airline is faced only with regulatory
liability and DOT enforcement actions that result in a civil fine or civil penalty.
See Tom Stilwell, Keep Calm and Fly On: Your Essential Guide to the Air Carrier
Access Act 17 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with BakerHostetler
LP). That said, Part 382 and the Federal Aviation Regulations may define the
standard of care applicable to claims by passengers arising out of the spread
of COVID-19. 14 C.F.R. § 382.19(c)(4) (“If your actions are inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this part, you are subject to enforcement action under
Subpart K of this part.”). See Allison M. Surcouf & Marissa N. Lefland, An Overview of Federal Law Governing the Carriage of Passengers Who May Have a
Communicable Disease on International Flights (Mar. 16, 2020), https://con
donlaw.com/2020/03/an-overview-of-federal-law-governing-the-carriage-of-pas
sengers-who-may-have-a-communicable-disease-on-international-flights/ [https://
perma.cc/YW82-DZS6].
136 See Surcouf & Lefland, supra note 135.
131
132
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diagnosis where inadequate information137 exists about the transmission of infectious disease in civil aircraft.138 This is unlikely
to succeed as researchers have noted that “[c]onsiderable debate
continues about the effectiveness and practicality of screening passengers at entry, exit, or both.”139
II.CONSUMER PROTECTION AND AIRLINE IMMUNITY
The previous Sections of this Article identified leading research concerning the risk of infectious disease spreading aboard
civil aircraft, outlined existing national and international laws and
regulatory gaps and problems related to the enforceability of health
mitigation measures in civil aviation, and described the legal mechanisms by which airlines themselves can safeguard their aircraft
from passengers who pose a direct threat.140
This Section examines airline liability for commercial claims
sounding in tort and contract as a general matter. It does so first
by qualitatively describing the Airline Deregulation Act and its
impact on the relationship between airlines and their passengers,
and second, empirically, by evaluating a split among the federal
circuit courts of appeals in the interpretation of the law’s sweeping preemption provision. Finally, it presents an important and
nuanced contract based exception to preemption. Taken together,
the content in this Section, coupled with the discussion in Part I,
supra, will inform a policy based analysis in Part III that evaluates whether a healthful aircraft cabin is an issue of “safety” or
“service”—in other words whether or not private claims related to
the transmission of infectious diseases are, or should be, preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act and national aviation
safety laws.

See ENFORCEMENT NOTICE, supra note 129, at 2–3.
See Surcouf & Lefland, supra note 135.
139 Grout et al., supra note 99, at e119–20 (“Further research must be prioritized before national and international legislation can take a consistent,
evidence-informed approach to screening, because flight duration and pathogen
transmission dynamics are just two important factors that challenge one-sizefits-all recommendations.”).
140 See supra Part I and accompanying text.
137
138
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A. Understanding Federal Preemption
The risk to commercial aviation posed by transmissible diseases, like COVID-19, may have complicated the airline-passenger
relationship, but it certainly did not worsen it.141 The deteriorating state of passengers’ rights has been years in the making as a
function of the special legal protections air carriers have under the
Airline Deregulation Act.142 The law’s breadth is nearly without
comparison,143 giving an entire industry a unique status in everyday commerce by virtue of granting airlines complete immunity
from state consumer protection laws.144 To be sure, the economic
policies and assumptions underpinning deregulation are defensible—albeit debatable and not fully realized.145 Additionally, the
law’s resulting benefits, low fares being the most prominent, are
consistently prized by most consumers over and above other features of commercial air transportation.146
But, an unintended consequence of the Airline Deregulation Act has been the gallingly bad things airlines sometimes do
to their customers, from imposing add on and ancillary fees for
offerings that were once standard and expected, to sometimes leaving travelers stranded, to shrinking seat size, to losing and damaging belongings, to bumping passengers from flights when they
have a ticket, to forcing families to pay fees to sit together.147 Among
the more horrendous examples to have gone “viral” is that of police,
at the summoning of an airline, dragging a bloodied passenger off

See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 418 (1992).
See id. at 418–19.
143 See id. at 384 (analogizing the preemptive sweep of the Airline Deregulation Act with a since amended version of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which preempted all state
laws “insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan.”).
144 See id. at 374.
145 See James W. Callison, Airline Deregulation—Only Partially a Hoax:
The Current Status of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J. AIR L. & COM.
961, 964 n.4 (1980) (noting that before deregulation, “[v]arious public opinion
polls had shown that the airlines consistently ranked at the very top among
all industries in terms of consumer satisfaction and confidence.”).
146 See id. at 968.
147 See Scott McCartney, Airline Rules are up for Review, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2018, at A11 [hereinafter Airline Rules].
141
142
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a plane,148 and a seven hour international trip that suffered four
different mechanical problems that kept a flight grounded three
days in a row with passengers boarding and taxiing out each day
only to end up back in the terminal standing in lines to reenter
the airport, collect luggage, and ride shuttles to hotels.149 Each episode was a “case study of the choices airlines make when flights
go badly wrong, and how ... it went worse fast.”150
In fact, barring external regulatory interventions, airlines
have little legal internal compunction, as opposed to innately market borne incentives and notions of good will, to do the right thing
by their passengers—or at least those passengers in the nonpremium classes.151 This is by design as Congress, in enacting the
Airline Deregulation Act, sought to encourage “maximum reliance on competitive market forces” and on actual and potential
competition.152 To effect this policy, lawmakers expressly prohibited the enactment or enforcement of any nonfederal “law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect
of law relating to airline prices, routes, or services.”153 In other
words, the economic dimension of commercial aviation—codified
in the Airline Deregulation Act by the terms “prices, routes, and
service[s]”—are matters of federal law exclusively.154 Consequently,
the consumer protection laws applicable to local and interstate
firms like hotels, car dealerships, cruise ships, movie theaters, and
nearly any other retailer and consumer facing business do not
apply to airlines.155
See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, Doctor Who Was Dragged, Screaming, from United
Airlines Flight Finally Breaks Silence, WASH. POST (Apr. 9., 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/04/09/doctor-who-was-dragged-scream
ing-united-airlines-flight-finally-breaks-silence/ [https://perma.cc/J97G-3UH3].
149 See Scott McCartney, The American Flight that Wouldn’t Take Off, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 26, 2019, at A13 (reporting that passengers had reached their emotional limits and “broke down”: “Some sobbed uncontrollably [while others]
screamed at airline employees they were out of vital medicine ... or were losing
thousands of dollars of work pay.”).
150 Id.
151 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 379 (1992).
152 See id. at 378 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4), (9)).
153 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
154 Id.
155 See id.
148

2021]

AIRLINE IMMUNITY

147

The federal character of aviation law is not inherently
problematic. In fact, it is explicable given the national goal of
centralized authority over innately interstate activities.156 But,
the substance of federal aviation laws raise concerns insofar as
they are generally silent on consumer protection issues or else
clear in their intent to deprive consumers of private rights of
action.157 What is more, the majority of federal courts of appeal
that have considered the Airline Deregulation Act have expansively
defined the terms “prices, routes, and service[s],” and construed
the anteceding phrase “relating to,” to mean that essentially any
state law claim having a connection to airline economics is preempted as a matter of law.158 Consequently, passengers are routinely left without any rights or remedies for practices that
would be actionable under state law if undertaken by almost any
nonairline business.159 Indeed, airline passenger consumer protection grievances rarely advance or survive beyond the pleading or
motion to dismiss stage.160
Thus, aggrieved passengers are often left with no choice but
the extraordinary one of lobbying members of Congress to pass
laws that address and resolve problems best avoided at the ticket
counter.161 But, even if Congress is amenable to crafting legislation aimed at fortifying passengers’ rights (as it sometimes is on
a bipartisan basis), the rule-making process rarely offers timely
or complete relief.162 Altogether, then, passengers with claims tied
to airline practices and policies must overcome enormous legislative and judicial hurdles codified in the Airline Deregulation
Act and predicated on the theory that consumer choice should be
the primary tool for disciplining unpopular business decisions.163
Choose a different airline next time, in other words.

See id.
See Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A11.
158 See infra Section III.B and accompanying text.
159 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
160 See Scott Dodson, A New Look at Dismissal Rates in Federal Civil Cases,
96 JUDICATURE 127, 128 (2012).
161 See Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A11.
162 See id.
163 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1992).
156
157
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In fairness, the overwhelming majority of the millions of
passengers who travel by air daily are satisfied customers,164 and
the Airline Deregulation Act neither leaves airlines totally unsupervised nor passengers entirely defenseless in the consumer protection space.165 The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is
vested with jurisdiction to enforce consumer concerns or violations.166 As the Supreme Court recognized, this authority is vast
and exclusive,167 effectively stripping even state attorneys’ generals of their traditional mandate to enforce general consumer
protection statutes against any business operating within their
jurisdiction.168 The DOT has on various occasions promulgated and
enforced rules responsive to public outrage over airline fiascos like
holding people on planes for eight hours or more in poor weather
conditions (i.e., tarmac delay rule), bumping low fare customers
off planes to seat higher paying passengers, or broadcasting misleading advertisements.169 In 2018, moreover, a bipartisan Congress required the DOT to hire an Aviation Consumer Advocate to
help travelers resolve service complaints, audit the DOT’s handling of such complaints, and make recommendations to improve
enforcement of aviation consumer protection rules.170 In connection with the COVID-19 pandemic during which airlines ignored
federal law by forcing passengers to take vouchers for cancelled
trips,171 the DOT twice issued an Enforcement Notice warning
Attentive Flight Crews, Flexible Fares and Charges During the Pandemic
Drive Record High Customer Satisfaction with North American Airlines, J.D.
Power Finds, J.D. POWER (May 12, 2021), https://www.jdpower.com/business
/press-releases/2021-north-america-airline-satisfaction-study [https://perma
.cc/Z3FC-MYGC].
165 See Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A11.
166 See Am. Airlines v. Wolen, 513 U.S. 219, 228 n.4 (1995).
167 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–79 (1992).
168 See id. at 391; see also Airlines Aren’t Making It Easy, supra note 20, at
A9 (reporting that Colorado’s attorney generally appealed to the DOT in light
of many complaints about Frontier Airline’s ninety day rebooking expiration
on its credits).
169 Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A11.
170 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3358,
3337–38.
171 Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A9 (“A credit from a store is usually
straightforward. A credit from an airline can be anything but: It’s often hard
to use, and you may never get back all your money.”).
164
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airlines that federal law required a prompt refund to passengers
whose flight schedules were changed significantly.172
That Congress and the DOT needed to take these actions—
and airlines flouted these rules without penalty173—suggests fundamental problems with an administrative regime that entrusts
politically influenced authorities with discretionary decision-making
powers in the area of consumer protection. For that matter, the
DOT’s zeal for consumer protection has been inconsistent over the
last few decades both in terms of rule-making and enforcement.174
For example, President Barack Obama’s administration aggressively focused on airline passenger rights and protections, imposing
millions of dollars in civil penalties for violations of consumer protection and disability rules and creating many new regulations that
imposed steep costs on the industry.175 In contrast, during President
Donald Trump’s administration enforcement of fines against major
U.S. airlines dropped eighty-eight percent over a two-year period
during which three hour tarmac delays more than doubled.176
Arguably worse than lax or episodic enforcement may be
the combination of a regulatory cycle of overenforcement or nonenforcement with consistent and persistent attempts by the airlines to opportunistically constrict the already limited universe
of rights passengers have under the Airline Deregulation Act.177
For example, airlines require parents to pay extra fees to sit together with their children—a practice industry observers describe
ENFORCEMENT NOTICE, supra note 129, at 2–3.
Id. at 3–4.
174 See, e.g., Scott McCartney, A Deadline Passes with Little to Show for Fliers,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2019, at A13 [hereinafter A Deadline Passes] (reporting
that the DOT had missed deadlines on key traveler related issues such as seat
dimensions and refunds for services not delivered: “The big question is whether
it ever will fully comply with congressional requirements signed into law by
President Trump a year ago.”).
175 See Scott McCartney, Muted Response to Bid for Air Travel Rules, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 2019, at A12.
176 See id. To be clear, it is not necessarily the case that regulatory proponents are Democrats while deregulation advocates are Republicans. In fact,
President Jimmy Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy successfully enacted the
Airline Deregulation Act in the first place. See, e.g., A Deadline Passes, supra
note 174, at A13 (“It turns out airline mistreatment of travelers is one area
on which a divided Congress can sometimes agree.”).
177 See A Deadline Passes, supra note 174, at A12.
172
173
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as an “underhanded business practice,” but one that the DOT has
done nothing to address when asked.178 In this sense, deregulation
seems to give airlines cover to advocate for rules that openly antagonize their clientele while the DOT idles. Part of an Executive Order signed by President Trump required federal agencies
to repeal, replace, or modify existing regulations,179 for instance,
“[a]irlines want[ed] to nix a host of rules that attempt[ed] to
keep them from mistreating their customers.”180 As one industry
observer wrote:
The rules matter because DOT is just about the only protection consumers have in U.S. air travel. If the airlines get what
they want, the government would weaken the tarmac delay rule,
which imposes hefty fines for stranding passengers on planes
for long periods, and eliminate a requirement that they show
the full price of a ticket when people shop.

Carriers have also asked DOT to scrap the twenty-fourhour grace period for a full refund when buying a ticket—you’d
pay a change fee even if you realized right away you booked the
wrong date or made a mistake in the passenger name. They want
to eliminate a rule that requires them to honor tickets sold for
“mistake fares,” and they’re asking for freedom to charge fees for
wheelchair service.
They also want to reintroduce bias in travel agency search
results, so one airline might pay to dominate the first page of available options you see, and drop requirements to show on time and
cancellation data with flights.181
In late 2020, the DOT acceded to some of these consumerunfriendly initiatives, principally by issuing a final rule that redefined the phrase “unfair or deceptive practice” in the aviation
consumer protection statutes.182 At the urging of the major U.S.
See Scott McCartney, Six Ways to Instantly Improve Flying, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 21, 2019, at A13 (quoting the president of the Family Travel Association: “If
you’re traveling with a 4-year-old, it’s not a convenience [to have seats together].
It’s a necessity.”).
179 Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
180 Airline Rules, supra note 147, at A11.
181 Id.
182 Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,707 (Dec. 7,
2020) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 399.79).
178
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airline trade association, Airlines for America (A4A), the DOT’s
definition of unfairness and deception now aligns with Federal
Trade Commission principles.183 Also at the urging of A4A, the DOT
established a new set of procedural rules that potentially hamper the DOT’s own rule-making and enforcement efforts in the
area of aviation consumer protection.184 For example, whereas the
DOT tended to make conclusory statements that a practice was
unfair or deceptive without also providing a reason for its decision,185 the rule now subjects future discretionary rule-making
to a hearing procedure, which affords airlines the right to be heard
and to present mitigating evidence.186 Finally, the new rule permits the presentation of evidence before any determination against
an airline of anticompetitive or unfair practice,187 and requires
the DOT to explain its decision-making process and the evidence
it considered when making a determination of whether a practice is unfair and deceptive.188 Transparency is good, of course,
but it is best when it flows in both directions, not just as to enforcement proceedings against airlines and not as to the policies
of airlines as applied to passengers.189 Yet, the airline industry
has persuaded lawmakers to narrow the definition of deceptive
and unfair practices and provide additional due process rights
for carriers to be heard in opposition to the consumer protection
challenges against them.190
To be sure, the legacy of the Airline Deregulation Act is
mixed as stakeholders have struggled to arrive at an equilibrium
between creating value for and protecting consumers, on the one
183 Id. at 78,708. An act or practice is unfair where it: (1) causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers; (2) cannot reasonably be avoided by
consumers; and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition. Id. An act or practice is deceptive where: (1) a representation,
omission, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) a consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is considered
reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the misleading representation,
omissions, or practice is material. Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See id.
190 Id.
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hand, and the goal of eliminating red tape for the industry, on the
other.191 That is perhaps the cost of any deregulatory scheme.
Less palatable, however, is the lack of a clear cut and consistent
principle or rule of law as to the construction of “prices, routes,
and services” in the Airline Deregulation Act.192 The next Section details the state of the law in this regard, shedding light on
the mechanics of adjudicating claims under the Airline Deregulation Act and the particular complexity of deciding claims “relating to” an airline’s “services.”193
B. Defining “Relating to” and “Services”
Resolution of state law claims arising under the Airline
Deregulation Act and challenging some aspect an airline’s dealings
with passengers invariably centers on a key question—whether
a state law claim is “related to” the “service of an air carrier.”194
The state law is preempted if so.195 Resolving this question requires courts first to define the phrase “related to” and the word
“service” as used in 49 U.S.C. § 41713.196 The Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1992, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.197
There, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned
that “the ordinary meaning of these words [‘related to’] is a broad
one—‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with,’—
and the words thus express a broad preemptive purpose.”198 In
this context, “so long as the state law has a connection with airline
prices, routes or services, preemption under § 41713 is mandated”
and “[t]his [connection exists] so regardless of whether the state
statute specifically addresses the airline industry.”199
Goetz & Dempsey, supra note 29, at 962–63.
See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 572 U.S. 273, 273 (2014).
193 See id. at 273.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 374 (1992).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 383. “Relating to” was the original terminology in the Airline Deregulation Act and was later amended to “related to.” See id. at 383–84. Morales
regarded as “immaterial” the distinction which resulted from a nonsubstantive amendment of the original version “relating to.” Id. at 83.
199 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003).
191
192
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Notably, Morales did not define particular circumstances
under which a state law “relates to” air carrier services.200 Yet,
the majority of federal courts of appeal have understood Morales
as establishing a connection between a state law and an airline’s
activities in two circumstances: (1) where the law expressly references the air carrier’s prices, routes or services, or (2) where
the law at issue has a “forbidden significant effect” upon a carrier’s
prices, routes, or services.201 Stated otherwise, the phrase “related
to the ... services of an air carrier,” under Morales, “means having
a connection with or reference to the elements of air travel that are
bargained for by passengers with air carriers”202 and, according to
at least one court of appeals, which “includes not only the physical transportation of passengers, but also the incidents of that
transportation over which air carriers compete.”203 Altogether,
Morales helpfully provided a working definition of the phrase “related to” though it ultimately left it to lower appellate courts to
define the words “prices, routes, and services” themselves.204
Courts have not had too much difficulty deciding what and
whether state law claims “relating to” an airline’s “prices” or
“routes” should succumb to the preemptive effect of the Airline
Deregulation Act.205 Defining “services” is an altogether different matter, however.206 Indeed, federal appellate courts are split
between a majority position articulated by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and a minority position expressed by the Ninth and
Third Circuit Courts of Appeal.207
In Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that “services” “refers to such things as the
frequency and scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of
markets to or from which transportation is provided, as in, ‘[t]his
airline provides service from Tucson to New York twice a day.’”208 In
Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1255 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. FloresGalarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir. 2003).
202 Id. at 1258.
203 Id. at 1258–59.
204 Id. at 1256.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265–
66 (9th Cir. 1998)).
200
201
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addition, the Charas court held that “services” do not encompass
things such as “‘the dispensing of food and drinks, flight attendant assistance, or the like. ’”209 Charas held that a narrow
reading of “services” was compelled because a broader construction “effectively would result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline does. It seems clear to us that that is not what
Congress intended.”210 Charas, then, is passenger friendly because it defines “services” extraordinarily narrowly such that
most claims would fall outside of its definition and amenable to
state law claims.
The Third Circuit’s approach to preemption is generally consistent with Charas.211 In Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.,212 the Third Circuit held that the Airline Deregulation Act
did not preempt a defamation claim because application of the
relevant state law would “not frustrate Congressional intent, nor
does it impose a state utility like regulation on the airlines.”213 As
such, the Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. court acknowledged that even
claims, which conceivably are “relate[d] to” airline services, could
escape preemption if they did so in “‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral’ [a manner as] to be subject to preemption.”214
Taken together, Charas and Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. constitute a minority viewpoint that regards “services” very narrowly,
involving essentially little more than transportation from point A
to point B, and/or allows to proceed claims that bear only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to airline economics.215 By
declining to preempt state law claims with an attenuated relationship to the policies of the Airline Deregulation Act, Charas
and Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. ostensibly animate a statement in
Morales in which Justice Scalia clarified that the court, in broadly
construing the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption clause did
“not ... set out on a road that leads to preemption of state laws
against gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines.”216
Id.
Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266.
211 Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d. 186, 193, 195
(3d Cir. 1998).
212 Id. at 186.
213 Id. at 195.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 193, 195.
216 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
209
210
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Oppositely, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have applied
“services” expansively in line with Morales and more broadly than
the Ninth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal. In Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.,217 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, opined that “services” extended beyond transportation to include “matters ... appurtenant and necessarily included with the contract of carriage
between the passenger ... and the airline.”218 In this context, “services” includes all matters that are “a bargained-for or anticipated
provision of labor,” as follows:
“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated
provision of labor from one party to another. If the element of
bargain or agreement is incorporated in our understanding of
services, it leads to a concern with the contractual arrangement
between the airline and the user of the service. Elements of the
air carrier service bargain include items such as ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself. These matters are
all appurtenant and necessarily included with the contract of
carriage between the passenger or shipper and the airline. It
is these [contractual] features of air transportation that we believe Congress intended to de-regulate as “services” and broadly
to protect from state regulation. 219

As between the wide-ranging definition of “services” adopted
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, on the one hand, and the constricted definition of “services” applied by the Ninth and Third
Circuit Courts of Appeal, on the other hand, the majority of federal courts of appeal have found the former most compelling.220
Defining “services” thus remains a circuit by circuit, case by exercise, and no single definition of the term or interpretative
mechanism for understanding the term exists.221 Morales nevertheless provides a model for construing the Airline Deregulation
Act, and courts that read “services” broadly, as required by Morales,
do so with the common understanding that the Airline Deregulation
Act applies to the economic aspects of airline operations for which
44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 336.
219 Id. at 336.
220 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc., 813 F.3d 718, 727–28
(9th Cir. 2016).
221 See id.
217
218
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passengers bargain.222 While this covers nearly all dimensions of
the passenger carrier relationship, certain contractual claims can
proceed unimpeded by preemption (and have advanced in the
COVID-19 era), as discussed in the next Section.
C. Contracts of Carriage: COVID-19 “Refund Cases”
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the policy of United Airlines
was to offer passengers a refund if it canceled a flight and could not
provide alternative air transportation arriving within two hours
of the originally scheduled arrival time.223 The carrier changed its
policy to six hours at the outset of the pandemic, however, effectively denying refunds to millions of customers while violating a
longstanding DOT decision disallowing airlines from altering the
terms of tickets postsale.224 Then, the airline changed its policy
back to two hours, allowing passengers to get a refund, but only
on the condition that they take the initiative to call the airline.225
Altogether, following travel restrictions, lockdowns, and shelter in
place orders due to COVID-19, United Airlines allegedly changed its
refund policy four times within a span of seven days in March 2020
regarding passenger rights for altered flights.226
To be sure, United Airlines, like every airline around the
world, struggled to formulate coherent policies at the outset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, which posed an existential threat to the
entire commercial aviation industry.227 But, for sowing confusion
and making matters measurably more frustrating for their customers by playing coy with refunds in potential violation of federal
law, United Airlines was sued as a part of a federal class action
See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336.
Scott McCartney, Frustrated Travelers Battle for Refunds, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 2020, at A9 [hereinafter Frustrated Travelers]; see Ward v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926–27 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
224 Frustrated Travelers, supra note 223, at A9.
225 Id.
226 United Airlines Travel COVID-19 Denied Refunds, HAGENS BERMAN
(Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter United Airlines Travel], https://www.hbsslaw.com
/press/united-airlines-travel-covid-19-denied-refunds/passenger-files-class-ac
tion-lawsuit-against-united-airlines-for-denying-ticket-refund-following-coro
navirus-related-flight-cancellation [https://perma.cc/489U-HPUY].
227 David Gelles & Niraj Chokshi, Airlines Worried Virus May Erase Up to
$113 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2020, at A1, A12.
222
223
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lawsuit under state consumer fraud and protection acts, along with
claims of unjust enrichment and other causes of action.228 As explained in the discussion in Section II.B, supra, these claims were
dead on arrival under the precedent of Morales whatever their
merit (which was probably great given the undisputed nature of
the passengers’ factual claims and persuasive evidence of airline
noncompliance articulated in the DOT’s Enforcement Notice).229
Yet, for as poorly or obliquely as United Airlines behaved, its actions, and any claim based on its conduct, unambiguously “related
to” airline “prices, routes, and services” under either a broad or
narrow reading of those terms. Consequently, some courts had little
difficulty dismissing “refund cases” at the pleading stage.230
Notably, however, a class of commercial airline passengers
that sued American Airlines and Delta Air Lines for refusing to issue refunds for coronavirus-related flight cancellations fared better
than the lawsuits initially brought against United Airlines.231 The

228 Complaint at 17, 21, Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No.
1:20-cv-02124 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021). Similar suits were initiated or threatened against Canadian and European airlines such as Air France, KLM, and
Ryanair over their refusal to refund fares impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Oliver Whitfield Miocic, European Airlines Could Face ClassAction Suit over Unpaid Coronavirus Refunds, EURONEWS (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/28/european-airlines-could-face-class-ac
tion-suit-over-unpaid-coronavirus-refunds [https://perma.cc/GY52-HJJ9].
229 Refund-Related Lawsuits, supra note 28.
230 Amanda Bronstad, Class Actions Seeking Refunds for Flights Canceled
Due to COVID Hit Turbulence, LAW.COM (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.law
.com/2020/10/14/class-actions-seeking-refunds-for-flights-canceled-due-to-covid
-hit-turbulence/?slreturn=20210020203423 [https://perma.cc/8AS3-BAXY]; Jacob
R. Sorenson et al., Court Dismisses COVID-19 Flight Cancelation and Refund
Cases Brought Against Norwegian Air, PILLSBURY LAW (Sept. 23, 2020), https://
www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/cancellation-refund-class-action
-airline-covid-19.html#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/C77G-XZQE].
231 Delta Airlines Travel COVID-19 Denied Refunds, HAGENS BERMAN
(Apr. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Delta Airlines Travel], https://www.hbsslaw.com
/press/delta-air-lines-travel-covid-19-denied-refunds/delta-latest-airline-hit-by
-class-action-lawsuit-seeking-consumer-flight-refunds-amid-covid-19-outbreak
[https://perma.cc/ND89-VEGZ]; American Airlines Travel COVID-19 Denied
Refunds, HAGENS BERMAN (Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter American Airlines Travel],
https://www.hbsslaw.com/press/american-airlines-travel-covid-19-denied-re
funds/american-airlines-customer-sues-airline-in-class-action-lawsuit-demanding
-refunds-for-flights-cancelled-due-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/C77G-XZQE].
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law of contract explains why.232 Whereas the suit against United
Airlines sought to enforce state laws—general consumer protection
statutes and common law judicial doctrines like unjust enrichment—the claims against American and Delta turned on each carrier’s contract of carriage, that is the airlines’ own expression of
the terms, conditions, rights, duties, and liabilities accompanying
the tickets each sold.233 Under Delta’s Contract of Carriage, for
example, passengers are entitled to a full refund if the airline cancels a flight or changes a flight time by more than 120 minutes.234
American Airlines’ Conditions of Carriage similarly provides that if
the airline cancelled a flight or changed a flight time by over four
hours, passengers could receive a full refund.235 Because these
terms represented the voluntary undertakings of the airlines rather
than an externally imposed requirement in the form of state consumer protection statutes and decisional laws, some AmericanDelta passengers escaped application of the sweeping preemption
provision in the Airline Deregulation Act and overcame initial procedural hurdles put in place by the airlines’ respective counsel.236
More specifically, according to American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens,237 a Supreme Court case decided three years after Morales,
lawsuits that seek fundamentally to enforce the parties’ “own, selfimposed undertakings” fall outside of the Airline Deregulation Act’s
preemption clause.238 Importantly, this breach of contract exception extends only to the terms of the parties’ bargain, “with no
enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.”239 Thus, under Wolens, contract claims
survive preemption where the parties limit their dispute to the
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–29 (1995).
See United Airlines Travel, supra note 226; Delta Airlines Travel, supra
note 231; American Airlines Travel, supra note 231.
234 Contract of Carriage: U.S., Rule 19: Flight Delays/Cancellations, DELTA
AIRLINES (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.delta.com/us/en/legal/contract-of-car
riage-dgr [https://perma.cc/2B9A-P8D3].
235 Conditions of Carriage, Involuntary Refunds, AMERICAN AIRLINES (Apr. 29,
2021), https://www.aa.com/i18n/customer-service/support/conditions-of-carriage
.jsp?anchorEvent=false&from=footer? [https://perma.cc/A2TX-S3QK].
236 Ward v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926–27 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
237 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 223, 228.
238 Id. at 228.
239 Id. at 233.
232
233
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terms of their bargain, and a court can adjudicate a contract claim
without having to resort to outside sources of law.240
In this context, Ward v. American Airlines, Inc.,241 offered
a helpful path forward for passengers who were battling with
their airline for a COVID-19 related refund.242 Ward involved a
putative class action lawsuit demanding refunds for passengers
whose travel was impacted by the COVID-19 virus, and it largely
succeeded (it settled) under the precedent of Wolens.243 At the
pleading stage, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas rejected American Airlines’ preemption claim,
reasoning that the carrier had set the terms of its conditions of
carriage and therein represented that its customers, irrespective
of ticket types, would be refunded monies “if you decide not to fly
because your flight was delayed or cancelled, we’ll refund the remaining ticket value and any optional fees.”244 Therefore, the
preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act did not and could
not apply where passengers could plausibly prove that an airline
dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated.245
Claims sounding in contract under Wolens offer perhaps
the most promising mechanism for passengers challenging airline policies or actions,246 therefore, particularly as compared to
tort-based claims that invariably get thrown out for attempting
to enforce state laws “relating to” an airline’s “prices, routes, or
services.”247 But, they are not bulletproof.
For starters, airline contracts (or conditions) of carriage are
contracts of adhesion, and passengers lack any power to bargain
for, create, or modify the terms and conditions controlling their
240 Id. at 232–33; see also Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 288
(2014) (unanimous decision holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts a
state law claim for a breach of implied good faith and fair dealing).
241 Complaint ¶¶ 71–72, 83–84, 90–92, 99–102, Ward v. American Airlines,
Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:20-cv-00371).
242 See Ward, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 913–14, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
243 Id. at 928–29.
244 Id. at 927.
245 Id. at 926–27.
246 See Kent Anderson, Note, An Alternative Consumer Complaint Against
Frequent Flyer Programs After American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct.
817 (1995), 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 217, 242 (1996).
247 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–29 (1995); Hodges
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 337–38 (5th Cir. 1995).
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itinerary.248 For that matter, airlines have strategically leveraged their contracts of carriage to outflank consumer-leaning
legislators, for example, by promising to include certain consumer
protections in their terms and conditions as a way of warding off
lawmakers’ attempts to codify or fortify passengers rights under
federal law.249 What is more, even claims that ostensibly arise from
an airline’s contract of carriage may be swept up by the Airline
Deregulation Act’s preemption provision.250 That was the case in
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg251 in which the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed dismissal of a passenger’s claim arising from his
expulsion from a frequent flyer program because his cause of
action—for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing—was itself a creature of state law and so preempted to
the extent it was an attempt to use state law to enlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted.252
In all, contracts of carriage can be an effective tool to set
the mutual expectations of airlines and passengers in regular and
irregular times.253 And, for passengers especially, the written conditions of carriage are invaluable compared to the variability and
vastness of preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act. However, they do not necessarily free courts of the interpretative difficulties that typify lawsuits asserted on the basis of state law.254
For example, what constitutes a force majeure or “events beyond
our control” or a “significant” delay remain thorny issues.255
Sarah Firshein, The Fine Print on Your Plane Ticket May Have a New
Clause, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2020 at B8.
249 See, e.g., Chris Woodyard, Airlines Voluntary Steps Fall Short with Fliers:
Sky-High Gripes Bring New Call for Passenger Bill of Rights, USA TODAY,
Jan. 9, 2001, at B14 (noting the airline industry frustrated Congress’s attempt to
pass a “Passenger Bill of Rights” by creating the “Passengers First” customer
service plan, which did not include additional compensation for passengers);
Laura Goldberg, Airlines Detail How They Will Improve Customer Service, HOUS.
CHRON., Sept. 16, 1999, at 2 (detailing airlines’ promise to improve customer
service in response to the “passenger bill of rights” movement).
250 See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276 (2014).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 287–90.
253 See Ward v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 909, 927 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
254 See Ginsberg, 572 U.S. at 281–82.
255 See Bill McGee, Contracts of Carriage: Deciphering Murky Airline Rules,
USA TODAY (July 12, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/column
ist/mcgee/2017/07/12/airline-contract-carriage/469916001/ [https://perma.cc
/C4BD-B9EU]; Refund-Related Lawsuits, supra note 28.
248
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Moreover, no airline is required to offer a contract of carriage, and
every airline that does can impose whatever conditions of carriage it
sees fit.256 For that matter, even travel insurance may not cover
COVID-19 claims,257 and shrewd airlines now explicitly add public
health emergencies of domestic or international concern (as announced by government or other appropriate authorities) to their
existing lists of events that allow them to unilaterally cancel, divert,
or delay flights without liability.258 Doing so places COVID-19 and
future pandemic-related lawsuits squarely within the Wolens framework and potentially exculpates airlines by way of summary
256 See McGee, supra note 255; Richard Ritorto & Stephan A. Fisher, Exploring
Airline Contracts of Carriage and European Union Flight Delay Compensation
Regulation 261 (EU 261)—A Bumpy But Navigable Ride, 82 AIR L. & COM. 561,
564–65 (2017).
257 See, e.g., Christopher Elliott, What Travel Insurance Does Not Cover After
The Pandemic, FORBES (June 7 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopher
elliott/2020/06/07/what-travel-insurance-does-not-cover-after-the-pandemic/
?sh=54c24ce12d1d [https://perma.cc/MXR4-B224].
258 American Airlines explicitly does so:
When there’s an event we can’t control like weather, a strike
or other civil disorder, we may have to cancel, divert or delay
flights. If your ticket still has value (if you were, for example,
re-accommodated in a different class of service) we’ll refund the
unused portion to the original form of payment, but beyond that
we are not liable. Such “Force Majeure” events include ... [p]ublic
health emergencies of domestic or international concern.
Conditions of Carriage, Events Beyond our Control (Force Majeure), AMERICAN
AIRLINES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.aa.com/i18n/customer-service/support
/conditions-of-carriage.jsp?anchorEvent=false&from=footer? [https://perma.cc
/C8SF-XKRU]. In comparison, United Airlines addresses events beyond its control in more general terms and links that events to government action:
UA has the right to cancel reservations (whether or not confirmed) of any Passenger whenever such action is necessary to
comply with any governmental regulation, upon any governmental request for emergency transportation in connection with
the national defense, or whenever such action is necessary or
advisable by reason of weather or other conditions beyond UA’s
control, (including, but not limited to acts of God, force majeure
events, strikes, civil commotions, embargoes, wars, hostilities, or
other disturbances, whether actual, threatened, or reported).
Contract of Carriage, Rule 5 Cancellation of Reservations, UNITED AIRLINES
(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.united.com/ual/en/us/fly/contract-of-carriage.html
#tcm:76-6640 [https://perma.cc/2U63-STD3]. Southwest Airlines similarly defines
conditions beyond its control, inter alia, as events dependent on “[g]overnment
action.” SW. AIRLINES, CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE—PASSENGER 42 (33d ed. 2021).
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judgment if passenger contract claims somehow advance beyond
the motion to dismiss stage.259
III.ASSESSING AIRLINE LIABILITY UNDER THE
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The preceding Sections posit that, absent intervention by
federal aviation regulators (which is inconsistent), national aviation laws essentially immunize airlines from liability for mistreating passengers in the realm of consumer protection both in
general as well as in the particular context of the COVID-19 pandemic.260 Contracts of carriage, meanwhile, offer predictability
for both passengers and airlines, but are only as strong or advantageous for passengers as easily amendable contracts of adhesion go.261 Altogether, this discussion has been descriptive and
empirical in nature and has not necessarily attempted to assert
that the current approach to preemption or liability is optimal or
normatively desirable as a legal matter, though examples of
sour dealings between airlines and passengers certainly suggest
the status quo has many shortcomings as a practical matter.
This Section assesses potential claims against airlines related to pandemics such as COVID-19. More specifically, it makes
the affirmative case that airlines should be immune from liability.
In the consumer space, this would mean that claims such as unjust
enrichment, deceptive and unfair trade practices, and the like
should be preempted as “relating to” an airline’s “prices” and
“routes” under the Airline Deregulation Act. This is so notwithstanding numerous examples of appallingly bad treatment by
airlines of their customers, including their refusal to issue refunds,
their creation of unnecessarily complicated voucher schemes, and
their implementation of policies that too often made and make
matters more difficult and stressful for passengers whose travel
plans were disrupted by spread of the COVID-19 virus.262
Whether claims “relating to” airline policies and practices
associated with COVID-19 would fall within the word “services”
in the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption clause is a more
See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
See supra Section II.A.
261 See supra Section II.B.
262 See Frustrated Travelers, supra note 223, at A9.
259
260
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challenging question.263 This is so because an airline’s decision
to cancel a flight or refuse to board a passenger during a pandemic is arguably more a safety decision than an economic one
under the Airline Deregulation Act.264 And, because safety is not
an element of operation over which airlines bargain,265 claims
creditably couched in terms of safety could survive assertions of
preemption.266 Stated otherwise, the Airline Deregulation Act
does not preempt claims relating to or based on safety.267 Indeed,
litigation based on personal injury proceeds all the time.268 Nevertheless, existing regulations (aviation and nonaviation related)
are probative that even safety-type claims should be preempted
as Congress has arguably indicated an intention to occupy the field
of public health, particularly in terms of a national and global
pandemic.269 This also would mean that the law should regard
pandemic-related airline policies as constituting (preempted) safety
matters that fall exclusively within the ambit of federal law and
the authority of national regulators.270 In all, the law should find
COVID-19 related claims as preempted under federal law, if not
as “services” than as matters of both aviation and public safety.
A. Express Preemption and Congressional Intent
The weight of authority commands a broad reading of the
Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption provision, and in fact, courts
routinely rule that commercial tort claims against airlines are
preempted—expressly so.271 Express preemption “occurs when
the language of the federal statute reveals an express or explicit
See, e.g., Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1995).
See Alison Sider & Ted Mann, Airlines Press for Aid Topping $50 Billion,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2020, at A4.
265 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
266 See Smith, 44 F.3d. at 346–47.
267 See id.
268 See Matthew I. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
873, 895–97 (2000).
269 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007).
270 See id. 472–74.
271 See Roy Goldberg & Megan Grant, Ginsberg v. Northwest: An Opportunity to Bring the Ninth Circuit into the Fold on ADA Preemption, 26 AIR &
SPACE L. 21, 24 (2013).
263
264
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congressional intent to preempt state law.”272 Characterizing airline policies such as refunds and boarding denials associated with
COVID-19 or other infectious diseases as matters “relating to”
an airline’s “prices” and “routes” is reasonable, if not compelled,
in this regard.273 It is consistent with Morales,274 moreover, subject to the contract-based exception articulated in Wolens.275
Indeed, efforts by airlines to anticipate or respond to the
business consequences of COVID-19 and other infectious diseases
have costs—be it in terms of reducing occupancy by keeping middle seats open to ensure social distancing protocols, installing
seat dividers and shields, or purchasing and using new gadgets
to curb virus propagation.276 These costs almost certainly impact
(or may impact) airline prices and nonprice aspects of an airline’s operations.277 Moreover, these costs would impose a “forbidden significant effect” on airline operations in contravention of
the Airline Deregulation Act.278 As such, the preemption clause of
the Airline Deregulation Act surely would nullify state law claims
“relating to” refunds, cancelled flights, reaccommodation policies,
and schedule changes related to COVID-19 because such claims
have a connection with or reference to the economic elements of
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2014); Dia Adams
& Caroline Lupini, Master List of All Major International Airline Coronavirus
Change and Cancellation Policies, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/advisor/2021/02/05/master-list-of-all-major-international-airline-coro
navirus-change-and-cancellation-policies/?sh=489703ef1ba4 [https://perma.cc
/JJW7-7MZQ].
274 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992).
275 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
276 See, e.g., Delta Extends Middle Seat Blocking Through April 2021, DELTA
AIRLINES (Feb. 8, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://news.delta.com/delta-extends-mid
dle-seat-blocking-through-april-2021-only-us-airline-continue-providing-more
-space [https://perma.cc/HRY8-EL9J]; Cailey Rizzo & Christine Burroni, How
US Airlines Are Adapting to Ongoing Coronavirus Concerns, TRAVEL & LEISURE
(June 11, 2020), https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-airports/airlines
-coronavirus-cancellations-suspended-service [https://perma.cc/7UL8 -NAYB].
277 Deep Losses Continue Into 2021, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N (Nov. 24,
2020), https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-11-24-01/ [https://perma.cc
/2VGF-9E2N].
278 Morales, 504 U.S. at 388; see Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d
1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
272
273
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air travel, which Congress intentionally sought to remove from
the reach of state laws and regulation.279
Finding COVID-19 related claims expressly preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act is far from required under the law,
however.280 A finding of express preemption turns on congressional
intent and nothing in the history or text of the Airline Deregulation Act imagines preemption in the context of a public health emergency or makes explicit the idea that airline activities and policies
directed at public health emergencies fall within the “price, route, or
service” terminology of 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).281 One reason for
this, as discussed in Section III.C, infra, is that public health emergencies ostensibly relate more to airline operations and passenger
safety (for which traditional negligence claims may be appropriate)
than economics.282 After all, safety concerns primarily motivated
passengers to cancel their reservations at the outset and during
the pandemic.283 Passengers worried, among other things, about
getting sick or getting others sick—fatally so—or being marooned
someplace where stay-in-place or shelter orders would go into effect after their arrival.284 These are not the sort of garden variety
consumer complaints from which Congress sought to shelter the
airline industry.285 Rather, they are extraordinary concerns that
may warrant special consideration outside of the ordinary preemption regime of the Airline Deregulation Act.286
Another reason militating a finding of express preemption
may lie in the fact that Congress inserted a preemption provision
in the Airline Deregulation Act to ensure that states would not

See Morales, 504 U.S. at 278.
See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
281 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
282 See infra Section III.C.
283 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING
AIRLINE TICKET REFUNDS GIVEN THE UNPRECEDENTED IMPACT OF THE COVID19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY ON AIR TRAVEL 1 (2020).
284 See, e.g., Kim Schive, How Safe Is Air Travel?, MIT MEDICAL (July 23, 2020),
https://medical.mit.edu/covid-19-updates/2020/09/how-safe-air-travel [https://
perma.cc/SD2S-ENC5]; Tariro Mzezewa, Americans Abroad: ‘I Feel Completely
Abandoned’, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18
/travel/coronavirus-americans-stranded.html [https://perma.cc/MH3V-H5UN].
285 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386–88.
286 See id. at 390; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 224 (1995).
279
280
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undo federal deregulation with their own regulation.287 Allowing
a limited class of claims to proceed, say for unjust enrichment,
deceptive and unfair trade practices, or restitution arising from
the failure of airlines to readily accommodate passengers during
a health care crises like COVID-19, presents minimal to no risk
to deregulation policy.288 True, the last several decades suggest
that epidemics and pandemics may occur more frequently than
once every hundred years, but such outbreaks are episodic nonetheless,289 and the argument that allowing passenger claims to
proceed now will undo deregulation is a red herring, slipperyslope-type contention.
Nor would a narrow exception to preemption during a public
health crises undermine Congress’ determination in 1978 that
“‘maximum reliance on competitive market forces’ would best further ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices.’”290 In fact, by refusing to preempt consumer protection type claims arising from the
pandemic, courts would leave the dynamics of the airline marketplace uninterrupted.291 Concededly, the consequences could be
extreme, including widespread bankruptcies, or as actually happened, a decision by Congress to interfere in the marketplace by
providing enormous financial assistance bordering on nationalization (i.e., the complete undoing of deregulation).292 In either
case, by declining to expressly preempt consumer claims related
to the pandemic, courts would avoid artificially propping up airlines that were failing.293 Stabilizing the airline was never the
intent of the Airline Deregulation Act as evidenced by the striking number of airline failures that occurred after (if not because
of) the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act.294 In fact,
See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
289 See Frank Houghton, Geography, Global Pandemics & Air Travel: Faster,
Fuller, Further & More Frequent, 12 J. INFECTION & PUB. HEALTH 448, 448 (2019).
290 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4), (a)(9)).
291 See id. at 389.
292 See Niraj Chokshi, Relief Bill Gives Airline and Airport Workers a Reprieve, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/11
/business/stimulus-bill-airline-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/5EJQ-CAEK].
293 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 389.
294 Stacey R. Kole & Kenneth M. Lehn, Deregulation and the Adaptation of
Governance Structure: The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry, 52 J. FIN. ECON.
79, 84–85 (1999).
287
288
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airlines theoretically could not fail in the prederegulation era because they operated as a government-supported cartel.295 In contrast, by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress clearly
intended to dismantle that state of affairs, letting loose the competitive instincts of unregulated firms.296 Consequently, to find
COVID-19-related claims expressly preempted may be to overread
the language and policy of the Airline Deregulation Act.
Ultimately, however, the decision and power to carve out
an exception from preemption is properly a legislative one.297
And, until Congress acts, if ever, the majority of courts, under
the authority of Morales, may be inclined to construe the Airline
Deregulation Act as expressly preempting consumer tort claims
arising from public health emergencies, including those related to
the transmission of infectious disease.298 To be sure, some courts
may be swayed otherwise and find that lawsuits based on state
law arising from the once-in-a-generation pandemic are not preempted because they bear only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral”
relationship to airline “rates, routes, or services.”299 Courts taking this position may be persuaded by the argument that the claims
“relating to” “rates, routes, or services” are grounded in safety,
not economics, and are allowable, therefore.300
Ample anecdotal, textual, and historical evidence exists to
give judges pause in dismissing lawsuits against airlines on express preemption grounds in circumstances of unprecedented
disruption to air travel.301 After all, the DOT’s issuance of an
Enforcement Notice warning airlines that federal law required a
prompt refund to passengers whose flight schedules were changed
significantly due to COVID-19 is probative of the fact that airlines were, in fact, violating consumer protection laws even if state
attorneys’ general and state laws were technically impotent against
295 Reuel Schiller, The Curious Origins of Airline Deregulation: Economic
Deregulation and the American Left, 93 BUS. HIST. REV. 729, 746–47 (2020).
296 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
297 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
298 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–88.
299 Id. at 374, 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100
(1983)).
300 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 374, 388; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219, 222 (1995).
301 See All World Pro. Travel Servs., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1164, 1167, 1169, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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such behavior.302 What is more, aggrieved passengers who have
no adequate remedy at law could theoretically sue to enjoin the
appropriate federal agency to prosecute noncompliant airlines.303
Indeed, that the DOT issued its notice at all might and perhaps
should prompt lawmakers to revisit the enormous protections afforded to airlines under the deregulation act. Until such time, however, Congress has expressed no intent to walk back the preemptive
scope of the Airline Deregulation Act at any time, be they unprecedented or unimagined.304
In all, courts should be restrained and principled in their
interpretation of the Airline Deregulation Act even in never-beforeexperienced situations, and reformulation of the broad and express policies of airline deregulation should rest exclusively with
the lawmaking branch of government. An airline’s decision to
reroute passengers or issue vouchers instead of refunds may be
subject to federal law and DOT enforcement,305 but otherwise
falls outside of the purview of state law under the express terms
of the Airline Deregulation Act and is beyond the adjudicatory
powers of courts.
B. Implied Preemption
When the language of a federal statute does not reveal an
express or explicit congressional intent to preempt state law, courts
evaluate whether Congress somehow implied that its laws should
have preemptive effect.306 Courts have recognized two types of implied preemption—field and conflict.307 The latter occurs either
when compliance with both a federal and state law is a physical
impossibility, or when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”308 Conflict preemption is unlikely to be a feature of
claims against airlines in the context of COVID-19 because the
See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ENFORCEMENT NOTICE REGARDING REFUNDS BY
CARRIERS GIVEN THE UNPRECEDENTED IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY ON AIR TRAVEL 1–2 (2020) [hereinafter REFUNDS BY CARRIERS].
303 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1361; 5 U.S.C § 554; FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
304 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101.
305 See REFUNDS BY CARRIERS, supra note 302, at 1–2.
306 See Ariz. v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–400 (2012).
307 Id. at 399.
308 Id.
302
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DOT and FAA have promulgated no regulations related to onboard exposure that could conflict with state laws on the same
subject, though theoretically the regulations of other agencies might
be asserted to show conflict.309 Where grounds for asserting express preemption are indeterminate, cases arising from COVID-19
or other infectious diseases against airlines are likely to be litigated within the space of field preemption, “which occurs when
the federal scheme of regulation is so pervasive that Congress must
have intended to leave no room for a State to supplement it.”310
At least one court has evaluated implied (field) preemption
under the Airline Deregulation Act within the context of health
conditions onboard aircraft.311 In Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines,312
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered negligence claims
under California common law against various airlines for failing
to warn passengers about the danger of developing deep vein
thrombosis (DVT) and for providing an unsafe seating configuration
on domestic flights.313 In evaluating the claims, the court noted
that the FAA had issued “pervasive regulations” in the area of air
safety, including “airworthiness standards, crew certification and
medical standards, and aircraft operating requirements.”314 Given
that the FAA had issued these regulations and other guidance
materials regarding passenger warnings and aviation safety, the
court inferred a preemptive intent to displace all state law on the
subject of air safety and assert “the dominance of the federal interest in this area, and the legislative goal of establishing a single, uniform system of control over air safety.”315 In this context,
the plaintiff-passenger’s negligence claim failed because the FAA
had imposed no requirement that airlines warns about the risks
of developing DVT, and in the absence of any such requirement,
no breach of duty could be established.316
See id.
US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir.
1998)); see Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
311 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2007).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 468.
314 Id. at 472.
315 Id. at 473.
316 Id. at 468.
309
310
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Whether Congress intended to occupy the entire field of
regulation related to COVID-19 specifically, or infectious disease
aboard aircraft broadly, so as to preempt any state claims against
airlines is unclear, but also apparently unlikely.317 Neither the
DOT nor the FAA has promulgated COVID-19 specific regulations
related to onboard exposure.318 A fortiori, the DOT and FAA have
affirmatively deflected responsibility for matters respecting the
novel coronavirus, and instead, opined that other agencies bear
primary duty, specifically the Department of Health and Human
Services or the Centers for Disease Control.319 In an April 2020
letter to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), FAA administrator Steve Dickson emphatically stated:
[T]he FAA has statutory authority and responsibility to promote the safe operation of civil aircraft. Aviation safety is our
most important priority. While the FAA remains steadfast in
its focus on safety of flight, we are not a public health agency.
We must look to other U.S. Government agencies for guidance
on public and occupational health.320

This position is potentially fatal to any implied preemption defense that an airline could assert because establishing
that aviation regulators are vested with authority in managing
COVID-19 issues, let alone interested in occupying the entire field
of public health, is contradicted by statements of the relevant
regulatory authorities themselves.321
To prevail on an implied preemption argument, then, airlines
would have to establish that the DOT’s and FAA’s understanding of
their own powers is incorrect.322 At least one decision—Sikkelee
v. Precision Airmotive Corp.—may support that seemingly unusual
317 See Letter from Steve Dickson, Adm’r, Fed. Aviation Admin., to Joseph
G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l 2–3 (Apr. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Letter from Steve Dickson], https://www.alpa.org/-/media/ALPA/Files
/pdfs/news-events/letters/041420-faa-dickson-reply-covid-19.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SWV3-ZU8P].
318 See generally Coronavirus (COVID-19) Information from the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/EHL6-DXYD].
319 See Letter from Steve Dickson, supra note 317, at 1.
320 Id.
321 See US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
322 See Ariz. v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–400 (2012); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 2016).
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tact.323 There, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declined to “defer
to an agency’s view that its regulations preempt state law.”324
Rather, the weight the court accorded “the FAA’s ‘explanation of
state law’s impact on the federal scheme’... ‘depend[ed] on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.’”325
Under this precedent, courts convinced that the DOT and
FAA are wrong presumably would preempt passenger claims on
grounds of implied preemption, while courts unpersuaded by this
argument would rule against airlines, finding that the preemption
provision of the Airline Deregulation Act did not apply. Ironically,
this may invert the Hodges-Charas circuit split. That is, the majority of courts—which historically have been inclined to accept
an airline’s implied preemption argument—may now be compelled
to allow passenger claims given that neither Congress nor the agencies obligated to carry out Congress’ intention have expressed
any intention to occupy public health.326 In fact, they disclaim it.327
Meanwhile, courts adopting the minority position established in
Charas to rule in favor of passengers may decide in favor of airlines upon determining that the FAA and DOT failed to meet
their burden under Sikkelee to thoroughly, consistently, and persuasively establish that public health issues are outside of their
statutory responsibility.328
See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694.
See id. at 693–94.
325 Id. at 694.
326 See Ariz., 567 U.S. at 399–400; see also Letter from Steve Dickson, supra
note 317, at 2–3.
327 Letter from Steve Dickson, supra note 317, at 2–3.
328 A number of arguments exist to show that the FAA, in fact, may be incorrect. For example, some practitioners have noted that the FAA extensively
regulates crew member health, including what is required to be “fit for duty”
as a safety matter. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 117.5. In addition, the Department of
Labor’s OSHA COVID-19 Control and Prevention website discusses airline workers and employees, providing: “the occupational safety and health of flight
crewmembers (i.e., pilot, flight engineer, flight navigator) are under the jurisdiction of the [FAA] and not covered by OSHA standards while they are on
aircraft in operation.” Airline Workers and Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/control-prevention/airline [https://perma.cc
/67LL-98HY]. Whether this indicates an inter-agency recognition of FAA’s
jurisdiction in the area of airline crew member occupational health and safety, at
least with respect to pilots, notwithstanding what the FAA may have said in
323
324
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Suffice it to say that airlines will face formidable headwinds
in convincing courts to find nonprice tort suits arising from the
transmission of the COVID-19 virus, or infectious disease aboard
aircraft generally, to be impliedly preempted.329 To do so, an airline need not only establish that a claim “relates to” a “service,”
but also that it implicates safety.330 Alternatively, to the extent a
safety issue is raised, an airline must demonstrate that Congress
intended to occupy that particular issue.331 And, what makes all of
this particularly difficult, as the next Section shows, is that the
terms “services” and “safety” overlap—in some cases inextricably.
C. Infectious Disease on Aircraft: Service or Safety?
This Section explores whether an airline’s nonprice policies and practices relating to epidemics or pandemics are or should
be preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act or other applicable aviation laws. Resolving this question will require courts to
distinguish “services” from safety and potentially to make a difficult
policy choice between public health, on the one hand, and the economic policies of the Airline Deregulation Act, on the other.332
As an initial matter, differentiating “services” and safety is
as challenging as it is consequential.333 Drawing this line is consequential because the viability of a claim against an airline frequently turns on how a court characterizes that claim—“services”
are ostensibly subject to preemption under the Airline Deregulation
Act while some safety related matters are not, including personal
injury claims arising from aircraft operations or accidents.334
other contexts, is to be determined. See William H. Walsh & Anusha E. Jones,
The Efficacy of Preemption Defenses in Airline COVID-19 Litigation, COZEN
O’CONNOR (July 27, 2020), https://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publica
tions/2020/the-efficacy-of-preemption-defenses-in-airline-covid-19-litigation
[https://perma.cc/LE3L-ULSD].
329 Walsh & Jones, supra note 328.
330 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999);
Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir. 2003).
331 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367.
332 See Walsh & Jones, supra note 328.
333 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373.
334 State law personal injury claims are not preempted as evidenced by the fact
that the Airline Deregulation Act requires airlines to carry liability insurance
“sufficient to pay, not more than the amount of the insurance, for bodily injury

2021]

AIRLINE IMMUNITY

173

Differentiating the terms is challenging because safety and service overlap; safety is an inherent and fundamental part of every
airline’s core business offering of scheduled air travel.335 To say
that an airline can provide its services without safety is absurd,
yet saying that an airline offering safe flights without services may
well describe the actual experience of many economy-fare passengers. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Abdullah v.
American Airlines, Inc.:
Safe operations ... are a necessity for all airlines. Whether or
not to conform to safety standards is not an option for airlines
in choosing a mode of competition. For this reason, safety of an
airline’s operations would not appear to fall within the ambit
of the[Airline Deregulation Act] and its procompetition preemption clause.336

Reading safety as distinct from “services” theoretically means
that passengers may escape the preemptive effect of the Airline
Deregulation Act by framing their claims (including consumer
protection type claims) in terms of safety.337 This possibility and
the blurry boundary between airline “services” and safety that
courts may confront in this regard is not hard to imagine.
Suppose that an airline, confronted with the global reality
of transmission of a potentially fatal airborne infectious disease,
decides against installing seat dividers and shields because such
features add weight, cost, and complexity to commercial operations.
Instead, the airline sanitizes aircraft through other industry standard means.338 Imagine further that a prospective passenger of that
airline, fearful of contracting the disease, cancels his flight ahead of
the departure date and requests a refund of his (nonrefundable)

to, or death of, an individual or for loss of, or damage to, property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a).
In this context, nothing theoretically forecloses lawsuits against airlines for
negligent operation or maintenance of ventilation and air filtration technologies aboard aircraft, including high efficiency particulate air filters (“HEPA”).
335 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 See Mike Arnot, See for Yourself: How Airplanes Are Cleaned Today,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/travel/corona
virus-airplane-cleaning.html [https://perma.cc/X5SN-GUZN].
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fare for an upcoming flight. The airline refuses, and not wanting
to lose his money, the passenger (reluctantly) travels as originally
planned. He allegedly contracts the illness while aboard an aircraft operated by the subject airline and ultimately dies. Later, his
estate sues the airline for a laundry list of claims, including breach
of contract, wrongful death, and negligence related to the passenger’s personal injuries (e.g., failure to warn, failure to prevent or
mitigate his contracting the disease). How should a court decide
these claims at the motion to dismiss stage if the airline raises
preemption as a defense, contending that the plaintiff’s claims are
disallowed consumer tort claims masquerading as allowable personal injury claims?
At the outset, arguably all of the claims imagined here
should be dismissed under the Airline Deregulation Act. The lawsuit in question plainly seeks the enforcement of state laws “relating” to “prices” as well as “services,” broadly defined.339 Seeking
a refund relates to price. It falls squarely within the realm of express preemption under Morales.340
Alternatively, to the extent fares are covered by the subject
airline’s contract of carriage, the passenger’s claim might resolve by
reference to that agreement under Wolens.341 A court could dismiss
the negligence components of the lawsuit, too, as such claims have a
direct connection with and reference to airline economics subject
to preemption under Morales.342 What is more, a court could also
find the negligence claims so relate to a subject matter (safety)
that is pervasively regulated by national authorities as to be impliedly preempted under the authority of Montalvo.343
But, a court could just as easily decline to find the claims
preempted pursuant to the Hodges-Charas framework for construing the term “services” in the Airline Deregulation Act,344 and
a court may be particularly inclined to do so given the gravity of
the injury alleged in the hypothetical.345 True, if the passenger’s
See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388, 390 (1992).
341 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 219 (1995).
342 Morales, 504 U.S. at 375.
343 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
344 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1995);
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998).
345 See, e.g., El Al Israel, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 159 (1999).
339
340
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estate ultimately recovered damages, the judgment could affect the
airline’s ticket selling, training, or other practices. Yet, allowing
negligence allegations associated with a public health issue to proceed would not necessarily entail regulation of the economic or
contractual aspects of the flight.346 Indeed, a court could find that
any effect on the price or nonprice aspects of an airline’s operations
would be “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral” to be preempted.347 In
doing so, the court could rest its holding on Charas, which construed “services” narrowly as referring to the limited universe of
issues associated with “the frequency and scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from which transportation is provided.”348 Disease mitigation falls outside of this narrow
definition and the preemptive clause of the Airline Deregulation
Act would not apply, therefore.349
Notably, these claims could also avoid preemption under
the broader holding of Hodges pursuant to which safety is not a
bargained-for element of air travel.350 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has reasoned that three elements must be present for a
particular service to be deemed a “service” for purposes of the Airline Deregulation Act: (1) it must fit within the limited range of
services over which airlines compete; (2) it must be bargained for;
and (3) the bargained-for exchange must be between an air carrier
and its customers.351 Airlines do not compete over safety records
like car manufacturers might in terms of airbags or running lights
or crash test ratings.352 No marketing campaign exists touting
Airline A as safer than Airline B. Doing so would not only be taboo
and counter to industry norms, but cannot and should not be true if
carriers are complying with uniform safety regulations and regulators are doing their jobs.353 Accordingly, compelling arguments
exist to find that negligence claims or claims otherwise plausibly
See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
348 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66.
349 See id. at 1266.
350 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995).
351 See Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th
Cir. 2003).
352 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999).
353 Id.
346
347
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associated with the transmission of infectious disease do not relate
to airline “services,” and so are not preempted.354
As the Branche Court noted,
even if ‘services,’ as used in § 41713, is construed to encompass
aspects of air carrier operations beyond the transportation of
passengers—i.e., the trappings and incidents of that transportation like on-board food and beverage services, ticketing and the
like—its definition is nonetheless still limited to the bargained-for
aspects of airline operations over which carriers compete.355

Stated otherwise, those elements of air carrier operations over
which airlines do not compete are not “services” within the meaning
of the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption provision,356 and so
state laws related to those elements would not be preempted.357
To the extent that efforts by airlines to mitigate the transmission of infectious disease are not services, then negligence and
other tort claims, including potential consumer protection type
claims against airlines, could survive a preemption defense under the Airline Deregulation Act.358
Interestingly, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised a
novel question: Do airlines, in fact, compete to be the safest in terms
of COVID-19? In other words, are airline policies and activities
arising from the potential or actual transmission of infectious
disease a “service”? Airlines have publicly disagreed among themselves about whether taking certain COVID-19 precautions represent a safety or service issue.359 Early in the pandemic (i.e., July
2020), for example, Alaska Airlines, Delta, JetBlue, and Southwest
instituted a policy of keeping middle seats open on their aircraft
to limit infection.360 Allegiant, American Airlines, Spirit, and United
Airlines took a different approach, “selling all seats when demand
warranted.”361 United Airlines vigorously defended this policy,
“describing ‘middle seats only’ as a ‘PR strategy and not a safety
Id.
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1258.
356 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 376.
359 Barnett & Fleming, supra note 74, at 2.
360 Id.
361 Id.
354
355
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strategy.’”362 This disagreement spurred a professor of management
science and statistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
to estimate the level of risk to U.S. airline passengers under both
“middle seat empty” and “fill all seats” policies. He determined:
Coach passengers on full flights two hours long on popular US
jets suffer a 1 in 4300 risk of contracting Covid-19 from a nearby
passenger. Under “middle seat empty,” the risk is approximately
1 in 7700, a factor of 1.8 lower .... The calculations ... however
imperfect, do suggest a measurable reduction in Covid-19 risk
when middle seats on aircraft are deliberately kept open. The
question is whether relinquishing 1/3 of seating capacity is too
high a price to pay for the added precaution.363

This study supports the argument that efforts by airlines
to promote social distancing within their airplanes is a safety
issue with an important economic implication.364 Arguably, then,
a passenger alleging he contracted an illness onboard an aircraft,
or cancelled a flight and sought a refund from an airline that did
not leave its middle seats empty, could sue the offending airline
for the consequences of its (economic) decision to “fill all seats.”365
Courts, in turn, could rule that airline policies and practices in
furtherance of public health are not “services” even though they
have an economic dimension.366
This result would be contrary to existing precedent, however.367 Morales, foremost, explains that the Airline Deregulation
Act preempts state laws, regulations, and policies that “would have
a significant impact upon the airlines’ ability to market their product, and hence a significant impact on the fares they charge.”368
State-law-based lawsuits against airlines for failing to scrap nearly
one-third of the capacity on each of its aircraft would qualify.369
And, leaving it to courts to decide which of the different approaches, “middle seat empty” or “fill all seats,” is a better policy,
Id.
Id. at 3, 20.
364 Id.
365 See Walsh & Jones, supra note 328.
366 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1999).
367 See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
368 Id.
369 See Barnett & Fleming, supra note 74, at 20.
362
363
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or whether reducing capacity to mitigate against the risk of transmission of infectious disease is a safety or “service” issue, invites
inconsistent results about matters more appropriately dealt with
by lawmakers.370 In any case, while “some safety related claims
may be tied to air carrier services, the very fact that they concern
safety, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate [a] nexus” to
“services.”371 As such, the connection between the “services” airlines offer and public health may be closer than first anticipated
such that preempting state law claims relating to public health
may, in fact, serve the purposes of the Airline Deregulation Act
and its inoculation of claims “relating to” airline “services.”
Wrangling over whether public health measures are “services” under the Airline Deregulation Act may be unnecessary,
however, as preemption is arguably consistent with the safety
responsibilities of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).372
For example, some aviation practitioners have noted sources that
may establish the “FAA’s traditional role in regulating the health of
flight personnel and passengers aboard aircraft.”373 In a 2006 notice
published in the Federal Register, the FAA acknowledged that it
“has statutory responsibility for promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce” and that “[t]he scope of this statutory
responsibility includes the performance of medical research intended to protect the occupants of aircraft from risks and hazards that are attendant to flight.”374 Additionally, the DOT and
FAA collaborated with HHS in 2020 to issue comprehensive
guidance on protecting crew, passengers and the entire aviation
workforce from exposure to the virus.375 Although the Public
Health Authority Notification is worded as a guideline,376 the
FAA has publicly expressed its expectation that airlines abide
See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367.
Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
372 See Walsh & Jones, supra note 328.
373 Id.
374 Public Health Authority Notification, 71 Fed. Reg. 8042 (Feb. 15, 2006).
375 U.S. DEP'TS TRANSP., HOMELAND SEC., AND HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
RUNWAY TO RECOVERY: THE UNITED STATES FRAMEWORK FOR AIRLINES TO
MITIGATE THE PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS OF CORONAVIRUS 1, 3 (2020).
376 U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., COVID-19: UPDATED INTERIM OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY GUIDANCE FOR AIR CARRIERS AND
CREWS 1 (2021).
370
371
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by federal guidelines and its intent to investigate incidents of
alleged noncompliance.377 Whether these guidelines are something more than best practices is debatable,378 but the notification
may also be probative of the FAA’s views of its own responsibilities and thus whether matters of safety are also nullified by the
Airline Deregulation Act or other federal laws under the doctrine of
implied preemption.
IV.INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE: WHAT IS AN “ACCIDENT”?
The Airline Deregulation Act and the Morales and Wolens
decisions discussed in Parts II and III, above, apply to airline operations to and from the United States, not to international carriage, which is governed by international treaty. But, given the
significant degree to which international air travel influences the
epidemiology of infectious disease,379 this Section looks beyond
domestic air transportation and evaluates legal claims arising from
the transmission of communicable diseases on overseas flights.
This analysis is also important because the relevant treaties applicable to international carriage constitute the exclusive set of
remedies available to passengers. Stated otherwise, when a treaty
governing international air travel allows no recovery, it correspondingly precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for damages under any other source of law, be it national or local law.380
Thus, just as the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state law in
the realm of domestic air transportation,381 so too does the law governing international air travel displace other state (i.e., national)
laws.382 What is more, just as the Airline Deregulation Act presents problems of statutory construction for courts—specifically
as to the definition of the phrase “relating to” and the terms
Walsh & Jones, supra note 328.
Id.
379 Allison Taylor Walker et al., Introduction to Travel Health & the CDC
Yellow Book, in CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION YELLOW BOOK:
HEALTH INFORMATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL (2020), https://wwwnc.cdc
.gov/travel/yellowbook/2020/introduction/introduction-to-travel-health-and-the
-cdc-yellow-book [https://perma.cc/5DB2-UFQM].
380 See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999).
381 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 374 (1992).
382 See 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1); Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
377
378
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“prices, routes, or services”—the Montreal Convention, and its predecessor the Warsaw Convention, present problems of textual
interpretation and application for litigants and judges.383
Fundamentally, an airline’s liability to a passenger in international carriage turns on whether an accident occurred and
caused injury.384 Under Article 17 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention),
[t]he carrier is liable for damages sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.385

The treaty does not define the word “accident” and courts
have not fully explored the phrase “in the course of embarking or
disembarking.”386 Whether a passenger’s contraction of COVID-19
or any other infectious disease aboard an aircraft constitutes an
“accident” under the treaty is unsettled, therefore.387 Also unclear
is whether liability could attach to an airline that implements precautionary measures such as preflight testing or other procedures
during the embarking and disembarkation phases of flight.388
For that matter, little guidance exists about whether the mode
of transmission—crew to passenger or passenger to passenger—
matters for liability purposes.389 Adjudicating issues such as these,
along with myriad other yet imagined scenarios, will present enormous evidentiary difficulties and involve intensely fact-based and
case-by-case analysis.
See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004); Branche v.
Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003); Morales, 504
U.S. at 383; Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985).
384 See Montreal Convention, supra note 382, art. 17.
385 See id.
386 See Air Fr., 470 U.S. at 399.
387 See id.
388 See id.
389 See Andrew Hamelsky et al., Protecting Your Business From Liability
Claims Stemming From Covid-19 Exposure, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (Apr. 6,
2020), https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Protecting-Your-Busi
ness-from-Liability-Claims-Stemming-From-COVID-19-Exposure.html [https:/
/perma.cc/2QLG-SPER].
383
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Nevertheless, existing precedent broadly suggests that lawsuits against airlines under applicable international treaty will be
unsuccessful on average—and less successful than they perhaps
should be as a normative matter.390 For example, courts have construed the word “accident” in Article 17 by focusing on causation.391 In the seminal case of Air France v. Saks, the Supreme
Court concluded that liability under Article 17 “arises only if a
passenger’s injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger.”392 There, a passenger
felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear during the descent of a
flight arriving in the United States from France, and just five
days after the flight a doctor confirmed that she had become permanently deaf in that ear.393 She sued, alleging that her hearing
loss was caused by “negligent maintenance and operation of the
jetliner’s pressurization system.”394 She was entitled to no relief,
however, according to the Supreme Court because her condition
represented her own internal reaction to the normal and expected
operation of the aircraft (i.e., normal cabin pressure change).395
This harsh result obtained notwithstanding the court’s clarification
that the “definition [of accident] should be flexibly [not rigidly]
applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a
passenger’s injuries.”396
But even if parties stipulate that an “accident” occurred,
another issue exists—which “event” should be the focus of the “accident” may be litigated, including for example, whether a carrier
would bear liability if a passenger traveling internationally contracted an infectious disease as part of the “embarking or disembarking” process. Courts have held that injuries that aggravate
preexisting conditions are not considered “accidents” absent proof
of abnormal external factors.397 Still, litigants may press courts to
construe the circumstances in which a passenger contracted a communicable disease as the liability triggering “event or happening,”
See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004); see also Air
France, 470 U.S. at 393.
391 See Air France, 470 U.S 403 at 393.
392 Id. at 405.
393 Id. at 394.
394 Id.
395 Air France, 470 U.S. at 395–96.
396 Id. at 405.
397 See id.
390
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especially if transmission is the result of an action—or inaction—of
the crew.398
In Olympic Airways v. Husain, for example, the Supreme
Court decided whether an airline’s conduct was unusual and unexpected, and thus a link in the causal chain leading to an “accident.”399 There, a passenger, Dr. Abid Husain, an asthma sufferer,
asked to be reseated away from the smoking section of the aircraft.400 The flight crew refused.401 And, as the “smoking noticeably increased in the rows behind” him, Dr. Husain required CPR
and oxygen; but, ultimately, he died.402 A wrongful death suit
followed on claims that the “unexpected or unusual event or happening” that constituted an “accident” within the meaning of
Article 17 was not Dr. Husain’s death, but the airline’s refusal to
reseat him.403 Framing the controversy in this way, the Supreme
Court held that the “accident” condition precedent to air carrier
liability under Article 17 is satisfied when the carrier’s unusual
and unexpected refusal to assist a passenger is a link in a chain
of causation resulting in a passenger’s preexisting medical condition being aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the
aircraft cabin.404
Finally, concerns about the spread of hypervirulent pathogens like COVID-19 invites litigants and courts to reevaluate
the contours of emotional damage claims brought by airline passengers traveling internationally.405 Courts have not addressed
whether any (or some level of) psychological distress over the risk
of contracting a communicable disease is cognizable under the
Montreal Convention.406 What is more, for decades courts have
declined to read Article 17 as allowing “recovery for mental or
See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004).
Id. at 644.
400 Id. at 647.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 644, 648.
404 Id. at 646.
405 See Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 410–11, 434 6th Cir.
2017).
406 See Judy R. Nemsick et al., Flying with COVID-19: Navigating Potential
Passenger Claims Against Airlines, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Mar. 25, 2020), https://
www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/flying-with-covid19-navigat
ing-potential-passenger-claims [https://perma.cc/6XRA-GBMA].
398
399

2021]

AIRLINE IMMUNITY

183

psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical injury or physical
manifestation of injury.”407 However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that passengers aboard
international flights may recover for emotional harm in the context of a health scare.408
In Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., a passenger was pricked
unexpectedly by a hypodermic needle (i.e., an insulin syringe)
that lay within a seatback pocket into which she had reached.409
The supervising flight attendant gave the passenger an antiseptic wipe and personally wrapped a Band-Aid around the passenger’s finger.410 Another flight attendant recommended that the
passenger see a doctor, but the airline otherwise provided no medical assistance.411 The next day, the passenger saw a family physician, who noted a “small needle poke” and prescribed medication
for possible exposure to hepatitis, tetanus, and HIV.412 “Two days
after the flight”, the passenger sent an email to the airline to follow up “because it had neither sent her a copy of the incident
report nor offered her any further assistance.”413 One week later,
the airline replied by email to offer a “purely goodwill gesture” of
“possible reimbursement” of the passenger’s medical expenses,
“without any admission of liability.”414 For the next year, the passenger underwent a battery of tests (all negative) and refrained
from sexual intercourse with her husband and from sharing food
with her minor daughter until her doctor told her that she could
be certain that she had not contracted a disease from the needlestick.415 The passenger subsequently brought suit (together with
her husband’s loss of consortium claims) for both physical injury
and “mental distress, shock, mortification, sickness and illness,
outrage and embarrassment from natural sequela of possible exposure to various diseases.”416
See, e.g., E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
See Doe, 870 F.3d at 409.
409 Id. at 406.
410 Id. at 409.
411 Id. at 409–10.
412 Id. at 410.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 409.
416 Id.
407
408
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In an extensive thirty-one page decision, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the Etihad Airline passenger’s
injury was actionable under the Montreal Convention because
her mental anguish was “damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury” as that phrase exists in Article 17.417 According to
the court: (1) the accident was the needle pricking the passenger’s
finger; (2) the accident happened on board the airline’s aircraft;
and (3) the accident caused bodily injury.418 Given these uncontested facts, the court concluded that the airline was therefore
liable for the passenger’s “damage sustained, which includes both
her physical injury and the mental anguish that she is able to
prove that she sustained.”419
So, what does all of this mean in a post-COVID-19 world?
Lower courts have greater flexibility in adjudicating liability for
“accidents” occurring in international air travel under Saks than
they do when assessing passenger claims under the strictly construed Airline Deregulation Act.420 To be sure, this is a function
of the differing focus of each law.421 The treaties that govern international air carriage are oriented to passenger rights and
“the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of
restitution,”422 while the Airline Deregulation Act effects a national economic policy that promotes industry interests primarily.423
What is more, the Airline Deregulation Act requires judges to engage in work with which they may be unacquainted or unpracticed, including statutory interpretation of highly detailed aviation
regulations and application of a doctrine (preemption) that presents
only rarely on most dockets, while the causation-centric framework for determining liability in the Montreal Convention may be
more comfortable territory for courts and litigants.424 All this said,
the results should be the same—transmission or contraction of
an infectious disease, be it crew to passenger or passenger to
Id. at 418, 427.
Id. at 434.
419 Id.
420 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992); Air Fr.
v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 392 (1985).
421 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378; Air Fr., 470 U.S. at 392.
422 See Montreal Convention, supra note 382.
423 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 422–23.
424 See id. at 383; Air Fr., 470 U.S. at 404, 406.
417
418
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passenger, should not give rise to liability for an airline.425 This
is especially so given the indeterminate nature of current research on the matter in current scientific literature.426
CONCLUSION
Existing federal law could and perhaps should do more to
remedy the bad ways in which airlines sometimes treat their customers. But, as currently configured, the market-oriented policies
underpinning the Airline Deregulation Act broadly and explicitly
obligate courts to preempt garden variety state law consumer
claims relating to airline prices and services. But, what about in
the context of public health crises? For example, should carriers
be permitted to assert preemption under the Airline Deregulation
Act as a basis to immunize themselves against claims demanding
refunds for passengers uncomfortable with traveling commercially? While passenger claims “relating to” airline “prices” are
undoubtedly preempted under the terms of the Airline Deregulation Act, nonprice elements of an airline’s operations arguably
fall outside the term “services” as the majority of courts have
construed that term in the deregulation law. In this context,
public health is not a type of service over which passengers bargain or airlines compete. As such, a narrow exception to preemption during a public health crises is not inconsistent with
Congress’ determination in 1978 that “maximum reliance on competitive market forces” would best further “efficiency, innovation, and low prices.”427 Airlines can compete to accommodate
passengers during difficult times, after all. Moreover, even if
stripping an airline of the protections of the preemption clause
of the Airline Deregulation Act exposes it to vast consumer protection type claims that accelerate or cause its collapse, failure is
a normal feature of the marketplace and nonbankruptcy courts
should not be in the practice of rescuing unsuccessful firms.428
See Nemsick et al., supra note 406.
See Michel Bielecki et al., Air Travel and COVID-19 Prevention in the
Pandemic and Peri-pandemic Period: A Narrative Review, 39 TRAVEL MED. &
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1, 2 (2021).
427 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2006).
428 See, e.g., Natali Sachmechi, Airlines Are Being Bailed out Again, Here’s
What Economists Think Will Happen Next, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2020, 10:00 AM),
425
426
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Change must come from Congress, not any court, however.
The Airline Deregulation Act nullifies the enactment or enforcement
of nonfederal law “relating to” airline “prices, routes, or services”
and Congress has not undone this state of affairs in the more
than forty years since it first freed airlines from the regulatory
controls of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Most recently, lawmakers in 2020 proposed some consumer protection measures, including the Cash Refunds for Coronavirus Act of 2020 to require
airlines to refund cash to customers who decided to cancel their
flight plans for any reasons during the pandemic.429 And since
the 1990s, laws proposed by both Republicans and Democrats to
reregulate the airline industry or appreciably fortify the rights
of airline passengers as a matter of law have effected only incremental changes, if any.430
In contrast, Congress has demonstrated its intent to occupy
the field of aviation safety by vesting regulators with significant
authority in numerous areas relating to commercial aircraft operation, including the health of flight personnel and passengers on
board aircraft.431 Thus, even if policies and practices associated
with the transmission of infectious disease are not “services” and so
not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act, passenger
claims that are fundamentally consumer protection suits masquerading as safety claims should be preempted under the doctrine
of implied (field) preemption under existing decisional law.432
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nataliesachmechi/2020/04/17/airlines-are-being
-bailed-out-again-heres-what-economists-think-will-happen-next/?sh=1aa3ec
f2356f [https://perma.cc/R3NB-8629] (quoting Stanford finance professor Jonathan
B. Berk: “People confuse bankruptcy with liquidation.”).
429 See Kenneth Kiesnoski, Proposed Law Would Guarantee Refunds for
Flights Canceled During Pandemic, CNBC (June 3, 2020, 11:54 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/06/03/proposed-law-would-guarantee-refunds-for-flights
-canceled-during-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/22HK-2926].
430 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-76, AIRLINE CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD ENHANCE DOT’S COMPLIANCE AND
EDUCATION EFFORTS (2018) (recommending that DOT develop performance measures for compliance activities); see also 14 C.F.R. pt. 259 (“Enhanced Protections
for Airline Passengers”) (regulating aspects of airline delays, cancellations, and
diversions and “to mitigate hardships for airline passengers during lengthy
tarmac delays and otherwise bolster air carriers’ accountability to consumers.”).
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In the final analysis, while it may be the case that, as between passenger and airline welfare, lawmakers reliably seem
to favor the latter, that is the intent of Congress and courts are
not the appropriate forum to undo that policy preference. Still,
spread of the COVID-19 virus has exposed an unimagined application of the Airline Deregulation Act. In this regard, this Article recommends that Congress consider amending the Airline
Deregulation Act to create a pandemic-type exception such that
airlines must refund passengers whose flights are cancelled (voluntarily or involuntarily) on account of a public health crises. This
would be in line with existing DOT policies.433 Or, Congress could
clarify that no such exception exists, sparring courts and litigants
the effort of divining the intent of lawmakers. Alternatively, Congress could establish a fund (drawn from existing aviation taxes
and excises) to proportionately assist airlines and passengers during
public health emergencies that significantly disrupt commercial
air travel. To be sure, the time may have come for Congress to
formulate a cure because, unfortunately, episodic epidemics and
pandemics may be the new normal as life in a global economy
returns.434 Providing regulatory clarity will ease the pain for both
industry and consumers at such times.
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